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ABSTRACT
SEMERAD, RYAN Acting the Part: How ‘Audience’ Problematizes Butlerian
Performativity in the Films of Darren Aronofsky, Kathryn Bigelow, and Lars von Trier
ADVISORS: Prof. Andrew Burkett and Prof. Katherine Lynes
Feminist and gender studies critics laud Judith Butler’s theory of the performative
construction of identity because of its capacity to liberate gender from the biological
essentialism entailed by previous identity theories. In this thesis, I show how six twentyfirst century films demonstrate the importance and problematic nature of ‘audience’ in the
performative construction of identity. Each film employs a dialectic model between their
protagonists and the reception they receive from diegetic audiences within the film to
describe performativity. Black Swan (2010) and The Wrestler (2008) demonstrate how
performative identities require an audience to legitimize them. Antichrist (2009) and The
Hurt Locker (2008) show how society functions as an audience that legitimizes flawed
performative identities. Melancholia (2011) and The Fountain (2006) illustrate how the
death of the audience destroys the performative identity. Butler’s theory doesn’t
adequately acknowledge the power of the relationship between performativity and
audience because she doesn’t entirely consider the audience’s influence on the
performative construction of identity. Each of the films examined in this thesis show
how either an explicit or implicit diegetic audience is largely responsible for a given
character's performative construction of identity. In doing so, they establish that
performative identities cannot be separated from the audiences because the performative
process is inherently a dialectic construct between performers and their diegetic
audiences. Therefore, scholars who engage with Butlerian performativity must more
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thoroughly consider the audience's role in authenticating performatively constructed
identities.
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Introduction
“This text does not sufficiently explain performativity in terms of its social, psychic,
corporeal, and temporal dimensions.”
--Judith Butler, 1999 Preface to Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of
Identity
“Significantly, if gender is instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous, then
the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative
accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves,
comes to believe and to perform in the mode of belief.”
--Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (emphasis
mine)
“The only ones who are gonna tell me when I’m through doing my thing is you people
here. You people here are the ones who are worth bringing it for, because you’re my
family. I love you all so much.”
--Randy “the Ram” Robinson, The Wrestler (2008)

In her highly acclaimed text Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of
Identity, Judith Butler describes gender as a feature of the human identity that is socially
constructed. For Butler, gender is unstable. A person isn't a particular gender; he or she
constructs a gender through specific actions, bodily movements, styles of speaking, etc.
A person dons a gender much in the same way he or she puts on a certain article of
clothing. That is, a woman is not a woman simply because she is female, a woman is a
woman because she acts the part of a woman—she behaves like a woman. Butler calls
this gender-identity construction process 'performative.' While there are many variants of
'performativity' (which will be discussed shortly), Butler's understanding of
performativity focuses on the construction of gender-identities. According to Butler, the
performative construction of a gender-identity is a process through which a person adopts
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and shapes features of his or her gender in an overtly extrinsic fashion. This performative
construction is accomplished through the repetition of physical appearances, stylized
gestures, or actions which have (for better or worse) been ascribed to those possessing
certain gender-identities. Importantly, Butlerian performativity entails a series of actions
that are necessarily visual. Moreover, although she doesn't explicitly state it, her theory
configures an individual's identity as dependent upon external observation. That is, the
Butlerian performer needs an audience—an audience that affirms their identity.
There is a pervasive ideological dissonance between Butler’s theory of
performativity and a practical understanding of the performative construction of identity.
Butler’s theory, renowned both for its complexity and its profoundly transformative
nature, destabilizes the simplistic and harmfully restrictive biological essentialism
entailed by previous theories of identity in regards to gender. Her argument’s liberation
of gender is an important part of the continuing development of feminism and is an
integral foundation for an understanding of transgender personhood. Personally, I find
Butler’s argument to be persuasive in its reformulation of gender as a social construct not
a biological necessity. However, Butler doesn't provide adequate attention to the role of
the ‘audience,' which makes her theory of performativity incomplete, and, as a result,
increasingly vulnerable to potential dismissal. Butler’s theory of performativity asserts
that a person’s gender-identity is a social construct that must be repeatedly established
over time. In formulating her theory, she incorporates and rethinks many of the ideas of
performativity first used by J.L. Austin in his work How to Do Things with Words, and
later adapted by Jacques Derrida in his work Margins of Philosophy. Butler agrees with
Derrida’s sense of the “general iterability . . . without which there would not even be a
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‘successful’ performative” (Derrida 325). That is, like Derrida, Butler supports the
argument that actions that successfully establish a particular identity must adhere to a
specific recognized form or style—a socially-approved “general iterability” (Derrida 325).
Additionally, and importantly, Butler agrees with Austin’s distinction between theatrical
performativity and real performativity. Austin argues that a “performative utterance
will . . . be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if
introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy . . . Language in such circumstances is in
special ways . . . used not seriously” (Austin 22, emphasis mine). Here Austin proposes
that theatrical performativity is a kind of false communication—it doesn't provide any
substantive, genuine information about the world or the actor's role in it. Butler makes a
similar distinction concerning theatrical performativity’s lack of authenticity in her essay
“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory.” She writes:
In the theatre, one can say, 'this is just an act,' and de-realize the act,
make acting into something quite distinct from what is real.
Because of this distinction, one can maintain one's sense of reality in
the face of this temporary challenge to our existing ontological
assumptions about gender arrangements; the various conventions
which announce that 'this is only a play' allows strict lines to be
drawn between the performance and life. On the street or in the bus,
the act becomes dangerous, if it does, precisely because there are no
theatrical conventions to delimit the purely imaginary character of
the act, indeed, on the street or in the bus, there is no presumption
that the act is distinct from a reality[.] (Butler 527)
Butler, like Austin, maintains that there are genuine performative expressions which
actually constitute identity in a way that is not “distinct from reality,” and theatrical
performativity simply cannot do this (Butler 527). One can easily “de-realize” the
theatrically performative act, delegitimizing its expressive, constructive power, because it
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is markedly false (Butler 527). Austin and Butler’s argument here brings up a subtle yet
important point: the social context in which an individual introduces a performative
expression has transformative power. In one environment, a performative expression is
“hollow” as Austin puts it; however, in another environment, a performative expression is
incredibly significant and meaningful—perhaps, even “dangerous” (Austin 22; Butler
527).
The central concern of this thesis is to show that Butler's performative
construction of identity requires the existence of a legitimizing, confirming audience.
This feature of Butler’s theory is implicitly present in the way she articulates the
distinction between theatrical performativity and real performativity. She describes how
a person's identity is real in one context and false in another not because of a change in
that person's actions or appearance, but because of a fundamental change in the way an
outside observer perceives that person. She writes “the sight of a transvestite onstage can
compel pleasure and applause while the sight of the same transvestite on the seat next to
us on the bus can compel fear, rage, even violence” (Butler 527). In other words, it isn’t
the transvestite—the performer—who dictates the reality of the performance, it is the
observer—the audience, who authenticates the performance. Thus, the reality and
significance of the performance depends upon the observing audience’s perception and
adjudication of the performance’s authenticity. Applying this conclusion to the
performative construction of identity, the authenticity of that identity, which is itself a
collection of repeated performative expressions, depends upon the audience’s perception
and confirmation of those individual, discontinuous expressions. Butler briefly hints at
this dependence, but she doesn’t fully investigate its implications. She writes:
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Just as a script may be enacted in various ways, and just as the play
requires both text and interpretation, so the gendered body acts its
part in a culturally restricted corporeal space and enacts
interpretations within the confines of already existing directives.
(Butler 526)
Here Butler is simultaneously admitting to the restrictive influence of the audience,
which in this case can be seen as the nebulous ‘public’ or ‘society,' and arguing that the
individual is liberated by the sheer number of potential interpretations on that audience’s
expectations. Nonetheless, Butler’s argument still entails the existence of the observing
audience. Moreover, she suggests that the multiplicity of interpretations available
“within the confines of already existing directives” liberates the performer; however, this
claim is undermined by her (and Austin’s) own charge that the observing audience
entirely determines the authenticity of the performer's identity.
This thesis does not take issue with the implications Butler’s theory has on gender.
As I mentioned above, I find Butler’s theory, on the whole, persuasive. As such, my
work does not address or even consider any controversies surrounding Butler’s theory as
it pertains to gender. The heart of this thesis is instead focused on the mechanics by
which Butler arrives at and constructs her theory. It is my position that she ignores the
enormity of the problem the audience has on performativity. Butler writes in Gender
Trouble:
Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of
agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity
tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through
a stylized repetition of acts. The effect of gender is produced
through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood
as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and
styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered
self. This formulation moves the conception of gender off the
ground of a substantial model of identity to one that requires a
conception of gender as a constituted social temporality. (Butler 179)
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This passage is incredibly important for Butler’s theory because in it she describes how
gender ought to be liberated from its entrenched position as a de facto identity and be
seen as nothing more “substantial” than a social construct (Butler 179). However, this
liberation only removes gender from the clutches of biological essentialism just to shift it
into another, albeit different, entrenched position: gender becomes a part of the pantheon
of identifying markers that are dictated by society not science. That is, a woman is not a
woman because she was born that way; she is a woman precisely because she acts in a
way people perceive as woman-like—she acts the part, as it were. In this way, for Butler
gender is, if anything, more of a “locus of agency” than previously described in the sense
that a person adopts a gender through behaving in a certain specific, socially-recognized
way. Additionally, the other features of a person's identity that are socially constructed
such as occupation, marital status, and so forth are not necessarily any less stabilizing
than the biological features that constitute the physical person.
This thesis shows how twenty-first century films illustrate the performative
identity's dependence on an external, legitimizing audience. As a result, these films are
themselves critical and theoretical interventions in human performativity. To this end,
they show how Butler’s theory suffers because she doesn't adequately consider the
influence of audience on performative constructs. Six characters from the films construct
their identities in a kind of Butlerian performative way—that is, through repetitive
stylized actions that establish their identities as socially constructed and not innately
present. I demonstrate how each character's performative construction of identity is
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vitally dependent on an audience within the film—a diegetic audience.1 In this way, the
films establish that the social construction needed to create “substance” from these
performative acts which are “internally discontinuous” is a result of an audience who
observes and, through that observation, legitimizes these identities (Butler 179). Each
character I focus on has an intimate connection with their audience either directly or
indirectly because their audience serves an important purpose: namely, the audience
authenticates their performative identities and doesn’t reduce them to “hollow”, artificial
expressions (Austin 22).
Film is a controversial yet fitting medium for undertaking this analysis of Butler’s
conception of performativity and the performative construction of identity. Film is
controversial in this endeavor because it appears to fall into the category of the ‘theatrical
performative expression’ in the sense that movies are (putatively) just collections of acts,
which are themselves overtly false. However, film is nothing like going to the theatre
and watching actual physical performers recreating a conflict. Film is not directly
representational in this way. As Gilles Deleuze explains in “Recapitulation of Images and
Signs,” film “does not reproduce a world, but constitutes an autonomous world, made up
of breaks and disproportion, deprived of all its centres, addressing itself as such to a
viewer who is in himself no longer centre of his own perception” (Deleuze 193). In other
words, film creates an alternative ‘world’ that exists sidelong to the real world; it does not,
like the flesh and bones performance of the theatre, create an overtly false world within
the real world. The authenticity of film is ambiguous. While it is certain that the images
1

Importantly, throughout this thesis, when I refer to the 'audience' I am not referring to the audience who
watches the films—the extra-diegetic audience—I am referring to the social audience within the films—the
diegetic audience—who directly or indirectly observes and confirms the performative identities of the
characters in each film.
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film presents are not necessarily real, they aren’t necessarily unreal either. In this way,
film recreates the shifting social landscape in which performative identities are
authentically constructed according to Butler. Thus, film is an ideal medium to
investigate the performative construction of identity because it replicates the authenticity
of performative identities in the real world.
I have structured this thesis in three chapters. The first chapter, “On the Stage,”
analyzes Darren Aronofsky’s films Black Swan (2010) and The Wrestler (2008). In this
chapter, I demonstrate how the protagonists of both films are not only onstage performers
but also construct their identities in addictive ways through their performances. In the
course of my analysis, I show that the key difference between these characters’
performative lives and their nonperformative lives is the presence of the diegetic
audience in the former and its absent in the latter. In this way, I establish that the
performative construction of identity requires an audience. The second chapter, “At
Work,” focuses on Lars von Trier’s film Antichrist (2009) and Kathryn Bigelow’s film
The Hurt Locker (2008). In this chapter, I argue that audiences can encourage and enable
specific problematic performative identities to be constructed. In the case of these two
films, I show how two men who are highly successful at jobs that are integral to society’s
continuity—namely, a therapist and a soldier—conflate their identities with their
occupations, causing them to neglect and endanger their families. The third chapter, “At
Home,” interprets Lars von Trier’s film Melancholia (2011) and Darren Aronofsky’s film
The Fountain (2006) as examples of how families can be diegetic audiences that
authenticate performatively constructed identities for individual family members. In
doing so, I argue that individuals’ performative identities come undone by the loss of the
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audiences that legitimize them. Altogether, these three chapters demonstrate the
significant role the audience plays in the performative construction of identity. They
show that the audience’s influence has the ability to fundamentally control the
performer's identity. Thus, Butler’s failure to address fully the power of audience over
the authenticity of the performative construction of identity leaves open the possibility
that her theory, in fact, only reformulates gender as “a substantial model of identity” that
is social and does not liberate it from other essentialist theories of gender-identity—a
conclusion which would ultimately undermine her project altogether.
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Chapter 1: On the Stage
Darren Aronofsky’s Black Swan (2010) and The Wrestler (2008) describe the
power of audience approval in the construction of performers’ identities. These films
present two performers who construct their identities through repeated performances, and
in doing so they construct their identities in something like a Butlerian performative
fashion. According to Butler, a performatively constructed identity is a social construct,
which is created “through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler 179). According to the
films, these two protagonists are existentially dependent on performance—their identities
are so inextricably linked to performance that they fundamentally cease to exist without it.
That is, without their performances, these characters cease to exist. Significantly, their
audiences encourage and enable their self-destructive addictions through the praise and
endorsement that comes along with observing their performances. As a result of their
protagonists’ performance-based identities, Black Swan and The Wrestler exemplify
Butler’s theory of performativity; however, unlike in Butler’s theory, these characters’
performative identities are intimately tied to their diegetic audiences—that is, the
audiences within the film who observe their performances. Butler understands that
identity theories’ tendency to categorize people in a seemingly arbitrary fashion is
capable of causing harm of some kind. In this way, she sees all identity theories, in one
way or another, as problematic: “I’m permanently troubled by identity categories,
consider them to be invariable stumbling-blocks, and understand them, even promote
them, as sites of necessary trouble” (Butler 1708). An identity category is a key
component to any identity theory that functions as a tool to differentiate between
identities, including certain kinds of persons and excluding others. For example, in queer
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theory, ‘gay’ can refer to any homosexual person or only to homosexual men. In the
latter case, the identity category ‘gay’ is more exclusive and restricts women as well as
transgender people from being included. Black Swan and The Wrestler can then be seen
as cinematic explications as well as complications of the areas of “necessary trouble” in
Butler’s own theory. The problem these films present is the defining role the audience
plays in the performative construction of identity. Both films highlight the audience’s
influence by distinguishing the performative world from the nonperformative world, two
arenas the films explore that I will define in depth shortly.
Butler describes the performances that construct identity as separate and
independent of one another. These performative discontinuities are the core of her
argument that identity is constructed post facto and is not essential, or not innately a
feature of a person. In Gender Trouble, Butler describes how these discontinuities
establish the performative identity as a constructed entity:
Significantly, if gender [a performatively constructed identity] is
instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous, then the
appearance of substance [the appearance of a coherent identity] is
precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment
which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves,
comes to believe and to perform in the mode of belief. (Butler 179)
Butler maintains that the gaps between identifying performances are the evidence that
identity is constructed because these gaps necessitate synthesis of the performances after
the fact. The discontinuous nature of these performances give rise to a hegemonic system
of identity politics in which there are identity-constructive actions (performances) and
there are gaps between those actions (non-performances). These two films are highly
concerned with explicating the distinction between these two arenas of existence, which I
refer to as the 'performative' and 'nonperformative' worlds. Importantly, Black Swan and
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The Wrestler describe the audience as an agent for the performative world which allows
the performative identity to be maintained between performances. In this way, the
performative identity requires the “social audience . . . to believe and to perform in the
mode of belief” in its construction during its performative gaps in order to exist as a
coherent “substance” (Butler 179).
The performative world is the arena of a performer’s life wherein she prepares to
perform and actually performs. In Black Swan, the film focuses on one ballerina in
particular: Nina Sayers (Natalie Portman). Nina’s performative world consists of the
dressing room, rehearsal space, stage, costume shop, and so on. In The Wrestler, the film
follows one wrestler: Randy the Ram Robinson whose real name is Robin Ramzinsky2
(Mickey Rourke). Randy’s performative world consists of the gym, the dressing room,
and the ring. The defining feature of the performative world is the presence of an
audience or the anticipation of an audience’s presence (these are the diegetic audiences of
the film). This is a crucial element of the performative world because it justifies the
performative world’s existence by legitimizing the performative identities constructed
within that world. Both films indicate that one’s actions cannot authentically construct
her identity without observation. As noted in the introduction, according to Butler, the
observational context of a performative act renders it real or theatrical—that is, defining
or superficial. Thus, performative acts require observation.

2

As we shall see later in this chapter, there is great significance to this nominal distinction thematically
within the film. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will refer to this character only as Randy the
Ram or Randy hereafter.
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The nonperformative world comprises every relationship, interaction, event, and
location outside of performance, where neither Randy nor Nina is recognized by their
performances. For Nina, the nonperformative world consists of her bedroom, the
bathroom, a restaurant, and a club. For Randy, the nonperformative world consists of his
trailer park home, his van, a grocery store he works at, a hospital, and a local strip club.
For both Nina and Randy, real interpersonal relationships with family and friends take
place in the nonperformative world, which excludes the audience. Additionally, the
nonperformative world serves as an intermediary for the different performances the
protagonists give. Thematically, it juxtaposes the characters’ relative ease in performance
with their anxieties and discomfort outside of performance. The films describe the
nonperformative world as a sickening place full of misery and conflict for these
performers. In this way, the gaps between identity-constructing performances reveal the
profundity of the audience’s presence: without the audience, Nina and Randy can’t
construct their performative identities. As a result, they suffer.
In Black Swan and The Wrestler, the audience plays a vital role in distinguishing
the performative world from the nonperformative world. In these films, the audience is
never present in the nonperformative world, whereas the audience’s presence or
anticipation of the audience’s presence is the raison d’être of the performative world.
Randy and Nina ultimately die from their performative identities because they stop taking
care of themselves in order to dedicate themselves to perform for their diegetic audiences.
Thus the films demonstrate the audience influences Nina and Randy to construct harmful
identities in the sense that they hurt themselves to please the audience. Nina and Randy
are preferentially divided between the performative and nonperformative worlds. They
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share an obsession with the performative world that undermines their ability to function
properly in the nonperformative world: they don’t have any real friends outside of
performance, and they both have to endure a variety of conflicts born out of their broken
or nonexistent families. In this way, Randy and Nina depend on the audience for the love,
affection, and especially the attention that they don’t receive in the nonperformative
world. The films don’t explicitly provide the order in which this dependency was
created—were their nonperformative worlds broken before their performative worlds
provided attention or vice versa? Nonetheless they establish that both Randy and Nina
need and desire the performative world over the nonperformative world.
The intensity of the passion these characters have for performance is at once
admirable and heartbreaking. Randy and Nina exemplify the absolute professionalism
that only the best performers possess. Their audiences love them for it. Unfortunately,
their dedication and commitment comes with a great cost. Moreover, because they rely
on their performances for the construction of their identities, they are at the mercy of their
audiences: if the audience desires a performance that requires them to destroy their
bodies or minds, they must do it—the alternative is equally suicidal since they conflate
their identities with their respective performances. Thus, their passion reveals something
other than dedication or commitment: it exposes the construction of their identities as a
kind of addiction and their audiences as the providers of their ‘fix.' This returns my
analysis to the problematic role of the diegetic audiences in these films. Do they observe,
and so encourage, an intensely passionate performer in her performance; or do they
observe, and thus encourage an addict in the throes of her addiction, egging her on
towards total self-destruction? I will show the audience’s observation serves the latter
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purpose: Nina and Randy are quite literally destroyed by the dialectic between
performance and reception.
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Black Swan: Nina Sayers
Black Swan uses Nina’s isolation and alienation from the nonperformative world
to establish her dependence on performance for the construction of her identity. In the
film, Nina is a ballerina in a company that is producing Tchaikovsky’s ballet Swan Lake.
She is cast as the Swan Queen, meaning that she will play the role of both the White
Swan and the Black Swan. Because she is cast as the lead dancer, Nina’s
nonperformative world takes on heightened significance: her behavior outside of the
company becomes everyone’s business, which forces her to reexamine her personal life
(or lack thereof). Throughout the course of the film, it is clear that Nina simply cannot
function in this world outside of the stage. Roger Ebert puts Nina's plight succinctly in
his review of Black Swan:
The tragedy of Nina, and of many young performers and athletes, is
that perfection in one area of life has led to sacrifices in many of the
others. At a young age, everything becomes focused on pleasing
someone (a parent, a coach, a partner), and somehow it gets wired in
that the person can never be pleased. One becomes perfect in every
area except for life itself. (Ebert)
Black Swan is structurally divided into two sections: the first section, which comprises
the first two-thirds of the film, focuses on Nina’s internal struggle between the
nonperformative world and the performative world; and the second section focuses solely
on Nina’s performance. Throughout the first section of the film, we see Nina alone and
isolated. She sits alone on the train. She walks home alone. She prepares for rehearsal
by herself. She dances alone. She sleeps alone. The moments when Nina does interact
with other people are strange, stilted encounters. Her conversations with her mother
Erica (Barbara Hershey) and her director Thomas (Vincent Cassel) are juvenile in an
unsettling way. In both instances, Nina appears weak and uncomfortable. Moreover, she
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reacts unpredictably and unstably around her fellow dancers. Nina mentally unravels
throughout the first two-thirds of the film. Nina’s social and interpersonal alienation in
this initial section directly contrasts with her performance in the final third.
Throughout the last third of Black Swan, Nina is graceful, elegant, powerful, and
utterly unhinged. Unlike the first section’s depiction of Nina as alienated and weak, this
section shows Nina as transcendent—even dangerous. When Nina performs, she is
uninhibited by her social ineptitudes and her mental degradation. Nina’s actions in this
performative world expose her alienation in the nonperformative world as a symptom of
her addiction to her constructed identity: without the audience’s affirmation of her, Nina
has no identity and as such struggles to function in a social way. The film even opens
with her dreaming about a performance. This moment shows how her performative
identity is enmeshed in her subconscious mind. Everything that makes up Nina—her
body, her mind, and her soul—is tied to performance. She has no other sense of identity.
The first section of the film portrays Nina as a fragile, damaged character. She
suffers from bulimia, anxiety, and hallucinations—potentially multiple personality
disorder and schizophrenia. She cannot communicate well with anyone in her life. She
is the epitome of naivety and vulnerability. Nina is an infantile neophyte in the
nonperformative world; she is unable to understand the adult world of sex, relationships,
and self-control. The initial section of Black Swan describes Nina’s nonperformative
world as unnerving because of her lack of stable, understandable relationships. To this
end, all of Nina’s relationships are terribly ambiguous. She has no father, or at least no
father present in the film. Her mother, Erica, appears to be overbearing and jealous at
times, yet at other times she seems caring and perhaps overprotective. The director of her
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ballet company, Thomas, is both abusive, and supportive. The only semblance of a friend
Nina has in the company, Lily (Mila Kunis), convinces her to take ecstasy the night
before an important rehearsal, which allows Nina to loosen up and approach something
like a 'social experience'; however, the drug also causes her to have a terrifying, suicidal
hallucination. As a result of the opaque significance of these relationships, the
nonperformative world becomes an impenetrable puzzle for Nina. Moreover, Nina
becomes more and more paranoid and afraid of the nonperformative world as time goes
on because its unintelligibility.
The nonperformative world’s unintelligibility is born out of an interaction Nina
has with the director of the company, which ultimately gets her cast as the Swan Queen.
This interaction highlights Nina’s struggle with the unpredictable nature of the
nonperformative world as well as her fragility in social situations. It begins when Nina
goes to see the director, Thomas, after she fails to impress him during her audition for the
lead role (the Swan Queen). During Nina’s train ride to Thomas’s office, there is a static
medium close-up of Nina putting on lipstick using the window of the train as a mirror.
The lipstick Nina uses belongs to the former lead dancer of the company Beth Macintyre
(Winona Ryder). This shot shows Nina donning the guise of the lead dancer before she
speaks to Thomas. This moment reveals that she wants to play the performative role of
‘Beth’—that is, the lead role. In their essay “Gender Undone: Subversion, Regulation
and Embodiment in the Work of Judith Butler,” Anoop Nayak and Mary Jane Kehily
describe this exact act—the application of lipstick—as an example of Butlerian
performativity. They write:
Consider, for example, the seemingly straightforward act of a girl
putting on lipstick. Rather than attribute this action to a knowable

Semerad 10
female subject, in Bodies that Matter Butler describes such activities
as a mode of 'girling' (1993) through which the 'subject' is only
made intelligible through action. 'My argument', she recounts, 'is
that there need not be a "doer behind the deed," but that the "doer" is
variably constructed in and through the deed' (Butler, 1990, p. 142).
(Nayak and Kehily 460)
In this way, Nayak and Kehily articulate how Butlerian performativity is intrinsically
performance-based. Moreover, they assert that specific, visual actions necessarily
construct one's identity. Thus, Nina's application of Beth's lipstick is an overtly
performative act (in the Bulterian sense of the phrase) wherein Nina attempts to become
or attain Beth's status. However, Nina doesn’t reveal this performative intention to
Thomas. She states, “I just wanted to tell you that I practiced the coda last night and I
finished.” The camera cuts to Thomas who looks irritated and confused, then cuts back
to Nina who appears to be on the verge of tears. Thomas dismisses Nina’s statement: “I
don’t care about your technique; you should know that by now.” He informs her that he
has already cast Veronica (Ksenia Solo) as the Swan Queen. These remarks demonstrate
Thomas has read into Nina’s intentions and has refused to affirm them. His comments
also appear to imply that he will not change his mind. However, later in the scene, that’s
exactly what Thomas does.
Thomas initially criticizes Nina’s dancing as “fragile” and “fearful.” He tells
Nina her greatest weakness as a dancer is her methodical style—according to Thomas,
she cannot transcend the dance and surprise the audience because she is so focused on
technical perfection. He goes on to explain that “perfection is not just about control; it’s
about letting go.” He condemns Nina for never “losing herself” in the dance. He
describes how she is perfect for the structured, innocent White Swan, but her obsession
with technique and control prevent him from seeing her as the Black Swan. As Nina is
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about to leave defeated, Thomas grabs her and kisses her. In response, Nina surprises
Thomas and bites him. It is this unexpected violent reaction that shocks Thomas enough
to see beyond Nina’s “fragile,” controlled exterior and cast her as the Swan Queen;
however, Nina doesn’t anticipate or understand this effect. For Nina, Thomas’s altered
opinion is inexplicable. Nina’s inability to see the effect she had on Thomas accelerates
her descent into madness and further complicates her nonperformative world.
Importantly, Nina's interaction with Thomas in this scene captures the way the
ballet's audience is an integral component to her performatively constructed identity and
her resulting self-destruction. Thomas is Nina’s director and as such he has complete
control over her performance. In this way—like the people who come to see the ballet—
Thomas’s opinion of Nina and her performance can either affirm or reject her
performatively constructed identity. Amber Jacobs, in “Debating Black Swan: Gender
and Horror,” reads this binary relationship differently. She argues that the film
“reproduces, romanticizes, and condones . . . the patriarchal conditions [under which]
women’s attempts to achieve subjectivity invariably result in madness, breakdown, selfdestructivity, and premature death” (Jacobs 59). In other words, Jacobs argues that the
film represents Thomas as the patriarch and Nina as an oppressed subject of that
hegemonic system. In this reading of the film, Nina’s mental breakdown and subsequent
suicide are due to her attempt to transcend the established gender boundaries of the
system. However, Thomas represents more than a man in power over a woman (in this
case, as the director of a ballet company, over many women—and men too). He is an
agent who controls performance itself. Nonperformative life for Nina is a quagmire of
unpredictable interpersonal relationships. She depends on performance to construct an
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intelligible identity. Thus, Thomas’s power in this situation isn’t rooted in his status as a
man and Nina’s status as a woman, but, like the audience of the ballet, it rests in his status
as a special kind of judge with the ability to either endorse Nina’s performance or reject it.
The fact that Thomas endorses Nina’s performance (and so selects her for the lead
role effectively enabling her addiction to her performatively constructed identity) is, as
noted above, unthinkable to her after her meeting with him. Another result of his
endorsement’s unintelligibility is Nina's further alienation from everyone in her
nonperformative world. Nina strains three key relationships in her nonperformative
world because of Thomas’s endorsement. Nina’s new role strains her relationship with
Veronica (a fellow dancer), her mother (a former dancer), and Beth (the former lead
dancer). Her new role strains these relationships because it destroys the performative
identity of the other person involved.
The social hierarchy of the ballet company’s nonperformative world is inversely
related to its performative world. That is, since a lead dancer like Nina is featured and
glorified during the company’s performance she is shunned outside of the performance.
The dancers in the company ostracize the lead dancer because of jealousy: every dancer
in the company strives to be the lead dancer, although there can be only one. It doesn’t
matter who the lead dancer is, she will be shunned by the others. For example, Beth was
the company’s lead dancer for many seasons until she stepped down. However, upon
hearing that she still showed up for rehearsal, the other dancers don’t reflect on Beth’s
dedication to the company or her humility in accepting a smaller role, but instead focus
on her age and lack of popular appeal. Veronica, the dancer Thomas had initially cast as
the Swan Queen, sardonically question, “What? She [Beth] can’t take a hint?” She goes
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on to state, “No one comes to see her anymore.” Nina tries to defend her: “It’s sad . . .
Beth’s such a beautiful dancer.” Another dancer, Galina (Kristina Anapau), acerbically
retorts, “Yeah. So is my grandmother.” This scene takes place in the dressing room for
the company’s soloists. While the dancers are tearing down Beth, the camera doesn’t
focus on them, but instead tracks their reflections in their mirrors as they apply makeup
and fix their hair. The camera’s interest in their reflections and its disinterest in their
actual faces illustrate the superficiality of their snide remarks and comments. These
dancers are attacking Beth to cover up their own aspirations: everybody wants to be like
Beth—everyone wants to be the lead.
From the moment Nina is cast as the lead—even before she knows about it—all
of the other dancers in the company aim their animosity and vitriol at her. This fact
compounds Nina’s misunderstanding of the nonperformative world. For one thing, she
doesn’t understand how she got the role. Moreover, she doesn’t understand the scorn and
disgust she receives from the other dancers. The conflict begins after Nina’s meeting
with Thomas. After Nina leaves Thomas, the camera cuts to Veronica, Galina, and
another dancer, Madeline (Janet Montgomery), who sit together in the drab cinderblock
hallway outside the dressing room. The other dancers praise Veronica for an incredible
performance. Then, the camera cuts to a close-up of Veronica who notices that Nina is
“staring” at her. Veronica asks the group, “Why is she always staring at me?” Her
friends respond: “She’s obsessed with you.” The moment is rich and complex. Nina
looks at Veronica because she believes Veronica has been cast as the Swan Queen.
Veronica looks at Nina with revulsion because she doesn’t understand Nina’s stare. Her
friends correctly assume it’s because Nina is “obsessed” with Veronica—that is, she

Semerad 14
wishes she had Veronica’s role in the performative world. However, the camera cuts back
and forth between them in a way that visually describes Nina as the person playing the
exceptional role: while Veronica sits among friends who encourage her, Nina sits alone
and is the subject of dirty looks and snarky comments. The mise en scene of the two
shots shows that Nina has already assumed the lead role. The cast list only confirms the
fact. Before Veronica can go read the cast list, Nina tells her “congratulations” because
she assumes she got the lead role. Nina walks off in the opposite direction of the list
sulking as Veronica flitters off excitedly to read the cast list. Moments later, Veronica
returns to Nina incensed: “why would you say that? . . . Your idea of some sick joke?”
Caught off guard, Nina asks, “What?” Veronica curses her: “fuck you.” Only after this
confused interaction does Nina learn that she has been cast as the lead role, not Veronica.
Thus, Nina’s role destroys Veronica’s temporary performative identity as the star of the
company. In this crucible of confusion, animosity, and surprise, Nina becomes a star in
the performative world, and the nonperformative world becomes a living hell. In his
review of Black Swan at the Venice Film Festival, Richard Corliss notes that “[g]etting a
lead role is a freaking nightmare” (Corliss). For Nina, it is fatal.
Nina’s mother, Erica, exacerbates the discomfort and rejection Nina experiences
in the nonperformative world by simultaneously supporting and opposing Nina’s
newfound stardom. Erica, a former dancer whose career was stunted by her unplanned
pregnancy with Nina, has conflicting interests. On the one hand, she supports her
daughter’s career as a ballerina by giving her a place to live, feeding her, encouraging her,
and attempting to protect her from the brutal reality of a harsh world—she encourages
and enables Nina to depend on her. On the other hand, Erica envies Nina’s success and
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holds her achievements against her. She stymies Nina’s social life, intrudes on her
privacy, and manipulates her emotions—she infantilizes Nina. In this way, Erica supports
Nina in a manner that prevents her from acting independently because she needs Nina to
be vulnerable and weak so she can construct a performative identity as her protector.
Thus, Nina’s elevated role as lead dancer represents a threat to Erica’s identity as the wise,
protective mother because this role allows Nina to get all the care and support she needs
from the audience of the ballet. In response to this existential challenge, Erica makes
Nina’s home-life increasingly unbearable. Erica deliberately sabotages Nina’s
independence. She forbids Nina from going out with Lily, a fellow dancer, and she
constantly checks up on her by questioning her directly and by calling the ballet’s offices.
Additionally, Erica herself becomes increasingly unstable and depressed. The first
incident of Erica's mental deterioration occurs when Nina gets home after being cast.
Erica surprises Nina with a disgustingly pink cake that she calls “our favorite.” Nina,
who suffers from eating disorders, declines to have a piece as large as the slice Erica cuts
for her. In response, Erica threatens to throw the whole cake out, stating, “well then it’s
garbage.” When Nina pleads with her not to throw it out, Erica responds with a nonsequitur: “I’m just so proud of you” (emphasis mine). In this moment the film’s musical
score becomes bombastic in order to heighten the tension of the moment as Erica,
wearing a black dress with an agonized, fake smile, is contrasted with Nina, dressed in a
pink bathrobe with a pained look of torture on her face. The juxtaposition of their
strained expression indicates the façade of the whole encounter. What appears to be a
mother congratulating her daughter is actually a woman lashing out at the absence of an
integral part of her performative identity: a helpless child.
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Henceforth, Erica’s attention becomes utterly consumed with a scratch Nina has
recently developed on her back. The scratch is barely noticeable; however, it appears to
grow and shrink spontaneously depending on the situation in which it is examined. No
one in the ballet company (not even the costume designer or the trainer) notice it or
comment on it. The only people that seem to be aware of it are Nina and her mother. In
his essay “The Looking Glass,” Joshua Clover maintains that in film madness is born out
of unnecessary visual repetitions—that is, too much of the same look, appearance, or
image. Clover writes specifically about Erica in Black Swan:
The mother [Erica], like so many screen maniacs before her, keeps a
shrine of the same portrait in near-endless repetition, with only
minor variation. In this case it’s a self-portrait. It is an underremarked matter that this has become a kind of unquestioned folk
belief, at least in the movies: the sign of madness is having too
many copies of the same image. (Clover 8)
According to Clover, Erica’s numerous copies of herself expose her madness. More to
the point, the variations in each painting are their only distinguishing features since their
subject is the same. In this way, Nina’s tiny evolving scratch, her only physical
imperfection, comes to represent for Erica the difference between the former Nina, who
was helpless and allowed her mother to construct a custodial identity, and the new Nina,
who has destroyed that performative identity. Erica first notices the scratch before Nina
even auditions for the lead role. When Erica points it out, Nina explains that “it’s
nothing,” and Erica doesn’t press the issue. After a gala Nina attends where she is
publically introduced as the new lead dancer, Erica notices the scratch again. This time
she flies into a furious rage about how she thought Nina had “outgrown that childish
habit” (although the film hasn’t shown Nina scratching her back at this point). She
proceeds to vigorously cut Nina’s fingernails while she describes how she’ll hide the
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scratch. All the tiny little details of Nina’s life (e.g., her fingernails, a tiny scratch)
become precious to Erica who is searching for a new identity to construct for herself via
her daughter.
Erica’s loss of her performative identity throws her into a manic state of
depression in which she projects her regrets over her own performative failures onto Nina.
Feminist philosopher Jane Flax describes how the complex interdependencies that exist
between mothers and daughters can cause such identity crises in her essay, “The Conflict
between Nurturance and Autonomy in Mother-Daughter Relationships And within
Feminism.” Flax writes:
As an adult, the daughter repeats the process by thwarting her
daughter's moves toward autonomy. She makes herself powerful by
overvaluing the son through whom she indirectly exerts power in the
outside world. She thereby fulfills her own repressed wishes for
autonomy and achievement. Her only source of emotional security
is her daughter, whom she cannot allow to individuate. Thus her
daughter ends up in the same situation as herself. Some mothers
encourage daughters to escape; but often in the process they convey
a double message of "be like me" but also "do not be like me."
(Flax 179, emphasis mine)
Flax maintains that mothers see their daughters as repetitions of themselves while they
see their sons as their unique products. Using Flax’s terms, in Black Swan Erica’s
“overvalued son” is the attention Nina receives from her role in the ballet. Perhaps, she
pushed Nina into dance through her disproportionate affection for this performative
attention. Either way, Erica needs Nina to depend on her—not the ballet—for her (Erica's)
own sense of identity. Since Nina gains a kind of individual identity as the star dancer,
Erica stifles any chance Nina has at achieving autonomy and individuality in the
nonperformative world, which ironically reinforces the importance of Nina’s
performative identity.
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In one particularly hostile interaction, Erica asks Nina about Thomas, the director
of the ballet. She asks if Thomas has “tried anything [with Nina]” stating that she has a
right “to be concerned” given his reputation. However, Erica’s concern appears
misplaced. She tells Nina that she doesn’t want her to “make the mistake [she] did,”
referring to the fact that her pregnancy with Nina ended her career as a dancer. Thus,
Erica is not concerned that Thomas is “taking advantage” of Nina—as she puts it—but
that Nina’s stardom will be cut short by his taking advantage. At the end of the day, what
matters is not Nina’s safety or well-being, but her identity as the star of the company.
Black Swan characterizes the star dancer of a ballet company as a problematic
identity for anyone to maintain. The main issues with this identity are: (1) it can only be
held by one dancer at a time, and (2) every dancer aspires to be the star. Thus, there is
fierce competition to acquire this role, and there is intense paranoia about being replaced
for the dancer who has this role. As a result of the emotional trauma that goes into
obtaining and maintaining the identity of the star dancer, it is no surprise that any dancer,
especially one as fragile as Nina, can become obsessed and addicted to it. More
significantly, the role provides such a powerful and important identity to a dancer that
losing it (by being replaced, retiring, etc.) is more than simply stepping down: a dancer
must sacrifice her identity. Therefore, Nina’s new identity destroys the performative
identity of Beth, the former star of the company. More poignantly, Nina’s relationship to
Beth foreshadows Nina’s own inevitable downfall. No dancer can be the star forever.
The conflict between Nina and Beth exposes the powerful attraction to being the
star dancer. Siegfried Kracauer describes the transcendent power of dance as a process
through which the dancer abandons the normal world of commonplace happenings. In
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The Mass Ornament, Kracauer writes specifically on dance in a chapter entitled, “On
Travel and Dance.” He writes:
What one expects and gets from . . . dance – a liberation from
earthly woes, the possibility of an aesthetic relation to organized toil
– corresponds to the sort of elevation above the ephemeral and the
contingent that might occur within people’s existence in the relation
to the eternal and absolute . . . The dancer . . . grasps eternity in
the rhythm: the contrast between the time in which he floats about
and the time that demolishes him is his authentic rapture within the
inauthentic domain. (Kracauer 72)
Kracauer’s understanding of dance as an “authentic rapture within the inauthentic domain”
shows dance to be capable of providing a religious significance to a trivial, artificial
world (Kracauer 72). Put another way, the star dancer’s performatively constructed
identity is something like a divine role that reveals the mundane, nonperformative world
to be not only insignificant, but utterly meaningless. Beth’s downward spiral after Nina
destroys her performative identity is so exaggeratedly violent, maddening, and selfdestructive because Beth loses the transcendent connection that identity provided.
Black Swan uses Nina’s two interactions with Beth to show how the
performatively constructed identity Nina has gained makes addicts out of performers.
The first interaction Nina has with Beth takes place after the gala at which Nina is
formally introduced as the ballet’s new star. Beth, who is in attendance, is a wreck. She
is miserable, intoxicated, and angry with the entire performative world. She doesn’t
mingle or talk to anyone. The only time she is shown at the gala is when Thomas gives a
speech about how she is retiring. The camera cuts to her disgusted face as she walks out
abandoning the façade of a clean, happy transition from one star to the next and revealing
the pain and anguish that comes with being replaced. Nina first speaks to Beth outside
the gala in a large receiving hall. Nina looks at a large bronze statue of an armless,
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winged, masked figured that visually alludes to both the suicidal Swan Queen in
Tchaikovsky’s ballet and Beth, the broken ideal Nina compares herself to. Immediately
thereafter, Beth bitterly questions how Nina got the role. She asks if Nina “sucked his
[Thomas’s] cock” to get the role. Nina responds, “not all of us have to.” In this situation,
the two women appear less like dancers arguing about a role and more like drug addicts
fighting over their fix. The camera quickly cuts back and forth between their faces, never
showing the two in the same shot, to reinforce that they are interchangeable. That is, they
both want the same identity; the only difference is that Nina possesses it, for the moment.
The conflict stalls once Thomas enters the hall because he controls both dancers’
performative identities as the director of the ballet. Again, Thomas represents the
audience whose approval is required for either dancer to construct their performative
identity as the star.
The second interaction Nina has with Beth crystallizes the interchangeability of
the two dancers and their mutual addiction to the performative identity of the star dancer.
For apparently inscrutable reasons, Nina seeks out advice from Beth, who is in the
hospital after getting hit by a car. The only sensible pretense for Nina's visit is her
concern that Thomas is going to replace her with Lily. Perhaps, Nina feels as though
Beth would know how to handle potential replacement since she was herself replaced.
Perhaps, Nina feels that it would cheer Beth up to know that her replacement is being
replaced. The film doesn’t give a clear answer, but Nina definitely feels responsible for
Beth’s downfall because she returns a few small items that she stole from Beth’s dressing
room in this moment. Nina explains that she took Beth’s things because she “just wanted
to be perfect like” Beth was. Acting like Beth and using Beth’s personal objects—
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essentially performing the role of Beth—would, in Nina’s damaged perspective, allow
her to obtain Beth’s role as the star dancer. Nina’s superstitious actions work, but her
paranoia causes her to unnecessarily conflate Beth’s fate—rejection—with her own. Beth
tells Nina: “I’m not perfect; I’m nothing.” In other words, because Beth loses her
performatively constructed identity, she becomes insubstantial and forgotten. Of course,
the ballet company is sad when she enters the hospital and sends her flowers, but no one
visits anymore. She is left alone to suffer a performer’s ultimate punishment: anonymity
and isolation. The film hints that this will be Nina’s fate as well. The camera shows Beth
stab herself in the face several times; however, as Nina runs away from the gruesome
scene, the camera looks back to reveal that the woman stabbing herself appears to be
Nina. It seems like Nina hallucinates this violent suicide, although the film leaves the
scene open-ended and does not confirm the subject of this mutilation. Either way, this
image of self-mutilation foreshadows Nina’s own self-destructive behavior during her
performance as the Swan Queen.
Altogether, Nina’s new performative identity strains these three nonperformative
relationships (Nina-Veronica, Nina-Erica, and Nina-Beth) in such a way that it reveals her
performative identity as the only sense of self Nina has left. Nina’s newly strained
relationships make the nonperformative world insufferable. The other dancers reject
Nina because she possesses what they desire. Her mother goes mad and figuratively
smothers her. Neither her mother nor the other dancers encourage and support her.
Nina’s performative identity isolates her in the nonperformative world. Thus, the
performative world becomes a kind of existential haven for Nina. In the performative
world, she is the focus of everyone’s positive attention. However, Nina’s relationship to
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Beth, the former star, demonstrates the transience of the positivity of the performative
world. Beth’s depression and self-loathing expose how both the nonperformative and the
performative worlds will become torturous when Nina is no longer the star. In this way,
the nonperformative world that accompanies Nina's performative identity is destructive
and obtrusive, and the post-performative world—the realm that Beth inhabits—is equally
if not more bleak. Therefore, Nina is trapped by her performatively constructed identity.
Nina’s performative identity becomes simultaneously claustrophobic and
transcendent during the final third of Black Swan. Nina is at her most paranoid and her
most graceful during her performance. She arrives to the theater late because her mother
believes Nina is unable to perform because “[she was] scratching all night.” Again, her
mother’s obsession invades Nina’s life. However, this delay only serves to heighten the
tension of Nina’s arrival at the theater. When Nina arrives, Lily, her alternate, is
preparing to fill in for her. Thus, Nina enters into an existential crisis caused by her
mother’s own subjective collapse. Nina’s actual performance reflects the duality of the
film and her life. Fittingly, the first section, as the White Swan who represents order and
innocence, is a disaster for Nina as she falls during the climax, whereas the second
section, as the Black Swan who represents chaos and danger, is magnificent and
transformative. Hence, the White Swan, for which Thomas originally thought Nina was
perfect, represents the disarray of Nina’s nonperformative world, and the Black Swan
represents the power and, ultimately, the fatal nature of her performative world. During
the second section, Nina literally transforms into a black swan on stage as she dances.
However, this supernatural moment, like others in the film, appears to be only in Nina’s
mind because neither the audience nor the other performers notice or are aware of this
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transformation. Regardless, the film uses this section to illustrate Nina’s transformation
from a common dancer to the star of the ballet who “loses [herself]” as Thomas pleads
for her to do. Unfortunately, Nina takes Thomas’s charge too literally as she ends up
killing herself during her final dance by stabbing herself with a shard of glass from the
mirror in her dressing room.3
What is particularly distressing about this finale is the audience’s response to
Nina’s final dance. The camera shows Nina notice blood coming from a wound in her
stomach halfway through her final dance. Because she so desperately wants to construct
her performative identity perfectly, she continues to dance even though she knows it will
kill her. When Nina finishes her dance, the crowd cheers and claps loudly. The camera
even cuts to her mother in the crowd who appears to be in awe at Nina’s performance.
Thomas runs over to Nina to congratulate her. Only then does he notice that she is hurt.
As he calls for the other dancers to help, Nina whispers to him, “I was perfect.” The
audience’s overwhelmingly positive reception of her dance, as well as Thomas’s initial
response, confirms Nina’s incredible performance. However, the cost for such a
performance is Nina’s sanity, well-being, and her life.
The diegetic audience’s approval and raucous celebration of Nina’s sublimely
suicidal performance exposes the audience’s perverse role in her death. The audience’s
positive response to Nina’s performance enables her to construct her performative
identity as the star dancer, which causes her death, because of its stark contrast with the

3

At this point, the film's adherence to realism has severely deteriorated. The film shows Nina literally
transform into a swan during her dance; it shows her kill Lily in her dressing room only to later find out
that Lily is alive and well. In this vein, the actual manner in which Nina procures the shard of glass on
stage is left unexplained.
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treatment she receives in the nonperformative world. On the one hand, Nina’s
nonperformative world is full of anxiety, misplaced animosity, and isolation because she
is the star. On the other hand, Nina’s performative world is composed of positive
attention and praise. The audience wants to see Nina perform, and they want to see her
perform well. They support and encourage her performance. However, because Nina’s
nonperformative and post-performative worlds are so bleak, the audience’s approval
enmeshes her in the performative world. Moreover, the audience’s support of Nina’s
performance almost gives her reason to commit suicide: for Nina, the world doesn’t get
any better than her moment as the star. In fact, the world will inevitably get much worse
for her, so ending her life in this transcendent, almost religious moment is a permanent
“liberation from earthly woes” (Kracauer 72). That is, Nina’s performatively constructed
identity as the star dancer is so superior to her experiences in the nonperformative world
that she is not only addicted to this identity, she would also rather die than lose it. Again,
the key difference between her performative world and the nonperformative world is the
positive support of the diegetic audience.
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The Wrestler: Randy “The Ram” Robinson
The Wrestler characterizes Randy as a lonely man who relies solely on his
performative identity as a wrestler for positive attention, a sense of community, and the
love his nonperformative world lacks. Like Nina, Randy’s broken relationships mar the
nonperformative world and make the performative world a sanctuary from emotional
pain. Randy is a complex character: he is a vulnerable brute; a savage performer with a
big, broken heart. The film depicts Randy as a person preferentially divided between the
performative and nonperformative worlds in a way similar to Nina; however, unlike Nina,
throughout The Wrestler Randy is subtly aware of this internal struggle.
The Wrestler blends Randy’s nonperformative and performative worlds together
seamlessly. Keri Walsh, in her essay “Why Does Mickey Rourke Give Pleasure?,”
describes the mixed presentation of these two worlds in the film as Randy “inhabit[ing]
the slur” (Walsh 153). However, for Walsh, Randy’s complexity doesn’t lie in the
struggle between the performative world and the nonperformative world but instead in his
mixed persona as a “nice guy” and “a prick” (Walsh 153). She writes:
A prick is a contemptible man – usually one with some worldly
authority – who has let that power get the better of him; he’s
imperial, self-aggrandizing, selfish, irresponsible. The Wrestler
leaves us to arbitrate between two versions of Randy. Is he the
prickish deadbeat dad who ruins the chance to reconcile with his
daughter . . . or is he the sweetheart who gives her a touching set
of secondhand clothes? This question is never settled. (Walsh 153)
Walsh’s analysis of the film focuses entirely on the symbolism of Randy’s performance as
the Ram which is “synonymous with prickish aggression, lechery, and penetration”
(Walsh 154). Walsh even notes how Randy's signature finishing move in the wrestling
world, called the Ram Jam, involves him thrusting his body at his weakened, supine
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opponent from off of the top rope of the ring in a way that embodies phallic penetration
(Walsh 154). However, in doing so, she ignores the extent of the audience’s role in
Randy’s construction of his “prickish” performative identity just as Butler doesn't
properly account for the influence of the audience in her articulation of performativity in
general (Walsh 154). The notoriety and relative fame the audience gives Randy enables
his prickish nature. The cause of Randy’s problems in the nonperformative world is, like
the cause of Nina's issues, the comparatively better treatment he receives from the
audience when he is performing. As a result of the audience’s endorsement, Randy
selfishly ignores his responsibilities as a father to focus all his energies on his
performative identity. Yet, Randy’s selfishness is born out of the attention his
performative identity garners for him. In this way, the question is not whether Randy is a
“prick” or a “nice guy.” Rather, the real quandary is to investigate why Randy is a prick.
Randy prefers the performative world because he is the star; however, he yearns for
similar acceptance in the nonperformative world. Randy never finds acceptance outside
of wrestling because he can’t handle the inconsistent, unpredictable, and often tragic
nature of that nonperformative world.
The Wrestler describes Randy’s meteoric rise to the top of the wrestling
profession in a romanticized opening montage of newspaper clippings and magazine
headlines accompanied by rock and roll music and the booming voice of an announcer.
Conversely, the film itself starts twenty years after Randy’s peak performative years and
is shot in a singularly realistic fashion. In his review for Entertainment Weekly, Owen
Gleiberman describes The Wrestler’s cinematography as “naturalistic”:
Aronofsky doesn't speak a sentimental cinematic language.
Shooting in a grainy, bare-bones naturalistic style, full of jump cuts
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and raw light and a handheld camera whooshing about, the director
of Requiem for a Dream and The Fountain now strips away all frills,
tapping a classic Hollywood myth — a has-been looking for
redemption — and, at the same time, transcending that myth.
(Gleiberman)
The Wrestler’s realism allows the film to provide a raw, uncut look at Randy’s life. The
film doesn’t hold back when it shows how Randy tragically has nothing save his
performative identity, which depends on a fan-base that has been dramatically reduced
over the years.
In the film, Randy’s bifurcated life is divided along occupational lines. In his
nonperformative life, he works at a grocery store. This job gives Randy a consistent
income. It also provides him with a sense of stability. In his performative life as a
wrestler, Randy can make great money at times, and at other times he can make no
money at all. Additionally, the quality of the venues he performs at fluctuates: some
nights he wrestles in a packed theater in a large city while other nights he wrestles in a
seemingly abandoned gymnasium at a local school. Despite the obvious fact that his job
in the nonperformative world is more practical than his wrestling career, and especially
given his age and physical maladies at this point in his wrestling career, Randy still saves
certain nights for wrestling.
Randy continues to wrestle because he is addicted to his identity as a wrestler.
Randy needs the positive attention the audience gives him in response to his performative
identity no matter how much that attention has diminished as he has gotten older. The
nonperformative world simply doesn’t satisfy his needs the way the performative world
does for him. As a wrestler, Randy is seen as a hero and a role model. He’s very popular
with other wrestlers and the fans. In the nonperformative world, Randy is a loser and a
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loner. He has very few friends and no family. He can barely afford to live in the mobile
home he rents. Nonetheless, he understands the absurdity of his dependence on his
performative identity in a way Nina never does.
After the first match shown in the film, his promoter and manager, Nick Volpe
(Wass Stevens), tells Randy about a potential rematch with his arch nemesis from his
peak wrestling years, the Ayatollah (Ernest Miller). Randy responds with a practical
concern: “Hey I heard Bob was doing really good with his used car lot out in Arizona – I
don’t know if he’s gonna’ come on for this.” Randy’s comment exposes his awareness of
the impracticality of wrestling for a man who finds success and positive attention outside
of the world of wrestling. Moreover, by referring to ‘the Ayatollah’ as ‘Bob,’ Randy
demonstrates how he makes an overt distinction between his performative and
nonperformative worlds. Significantly, Randy indirectly asserts that a person’s status in
the nonperformative world is more substantially defining than his or her status in the
performative world. Thus, according to Randy, if a man can achieve success in the
nonperformative realm, he doesn’t need to perform like Randy does. Despite Randy’s
understanding and awareness of these facts about the differences between the
performative and nonperformative worlds, he still chooses the former over the latter.
Roland Barthes, in his essay “The World of Wrestling,” writes that “the function
of the wrestler is not to win: it is to go exactly through the motions which are expected
of him” (Barthes 2). Barthes describes wrestling as an act of submission to the
expectations of whoever observes it. The wrestler, in Barthes's conception, must give up
his autonomy to the whims of his diegetic audience. Barthes conception of the wrestler’s
function fits well with Butler’s understanding of performativity as an adherence to
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“cultural conventions which essentially signify [identities]” (Butler 526). In The Wrestler,
Randy’s three matches show how his submission to the audience causes him to suffer
intense physical pain; however, it also provides him with the positive attention he lacks in
the nonperformative world. Barthes explains the appeal of this violent performance—
over and above the mundane existence Randy has in the nonperformative world—in his
description of wrestling’s significance. Barthes writes:
What is portrayed by wrestling is therefore an ideal understanding of
things; it is the euphoria of men raised for a while above the
constitutive ambiguity of everyday situations and placed before the
panoramic view of a universal Nature, in which signs at last
correspond to causes, without obstacle, without evasion, without
contradiction. (Barthes 5)
According to Barthes, wrestling is a medium through which the commonplace reality of
the nonperformative world—a reality wrought with complexity and undeserved
injustice—can be transcended to show the world in a grand fashion without the absurd
trappings that make it unintelligible. Therefore, the violence a person must experience to
produce this performance is not vain or indulgent, but incredibly meaningful as it allows
the world to appear logical and obvious instead of irrational and impossible. The
performance of wrestling gives the world order, albeit a socially-constructed order.
Randy’s performatively constructed identity is similar to Nina’s in that they both
perform in order to transcend the enigma of the nonperformative world. Kracauer and
Barthes describe dance and wrestling as tools that allow performers to escape the agony
of an ambiguous and confusing existence. Perhaps, both characters effectively achieve
this understanding of the world through their deaths, which their performances cause.
However, there is a significant difference between the two characters’ relationships to the
nonperformative world: unlike Nina, Randy almost finds meaning in the
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nonperformative world through a relationship with another person. Throughout The
Wrestler, Randy is in love with a stripper, Cassidy (Marisa Tomei). Cassidy’s real name
is Pam.4 She spurns Randy’s advances and rejects his suggestion that he should “make an
honest woman” out of her. Despite her dismissal of Randy’s affection, Cassidy does care
about him. After the first complete match of the film, Randy visits Cassidy. Randy
notices several patrons of the strip club insult Cassidy because she is older than the other
strippers. He threatens them and scares them off. Cassidy initially appears angry with
Randy because his threats cause “two-hundred dollars [to] just [walk] out.” However,
she quickly forgives him, hugs him, and gives him a lap dance. The playful way that
Cassidy handles and speaks to Randy is markedly different than the manner in which she
interacts with other clients: she has a special bond with him because they are both aging
performers.
In this scene, Randy and Cassidy’s conversation concerns how performers martyr
themselves for their audiences. After giving Randy a lap dance, Cassidy notices he’s
bleeding from a cut on his forehead. Randy explains that his cut is from his match earlier.
Cassidy states, “[she] thought wrestling was fake.” In response, Randy describes all the
very real injuries he has suffered for his art. After seeing his scars, Cassidy quotes the
book of Isaiah as she fawns over Randy’s broken body, stating “he was pierced for our
transgressions,/He was crushed for our iniquities;/The punishment that brought us peace
was upon him and by his wounds we were healed.” She implies that Randy is some kind
of savior. The tenor of the scene becomes very serious. Then, Cassidy calls him a

4

I will refer to Cassidy/Pam hereafter as Cassidy.
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“sacrificial Ram” and laughs. The moment reverts to a warm and playful state. However,
the scene describes an insidious reality: performers physically sacrifice themselves in
order to entertain their audiences. Both Randy and Nina suffer to please crowds and get
the attention they crave. For Randy, the crowd erases his pain. He states, “when you
hear the roar of the crowd, you just motor through [the pain].”
The cut that Cassidy notices on Randy’s forehead occurs during the only moment
of the first match of The Wrestler that lacks fidelity to filmic realism. Randy wrestles an
up-and-coming wrestler called Tommy Rotten (Tommy Farras). There is a surreal
montage before Randy’s match where the camera jumps around to a variety of different
wrestlers describing just how they want to be beat up with the giddiness of children.
Randy and Tommy choreograph their bout while the other wrestlers also carefully plot
out their matches. The whole moment takes on a degree of unreality: a group of large
men about to beat the shit out of each other are socializing like they’re part of a hybrid
sewing circle/fight club. During the match, Randy uses a razor blade he cuts and
conceals under his wrist-tape to slice open his forehead. When Randy cuts himself, a
sharp-pitched whine dominates the film’s musical score. This sound strays from the
naturalistic style in which the majority of the film is shot and edited. The sound repeats
two other times during the film: in the moments preceding a terrible heart attack Randy
suffers after the second match in the film; and during the film's third match as his heart
begins to give out. The sound represents the moments where Randy's performative
identity is physically destroying him in order to please the diegetic audience.
The film raises the question: why does Randy endure this physical pain if the
people who watch his matches don’t expect him actually to be hurt? According to
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Barthes, a wrestler’s job is to do what is expected of him. Therefore, it seems that real
violence is unwarranted. However, the audiences expect the wrestlers to maintain the
fiction of the match—to feign animosity towards one another. In order to do so, real
violence and real pain are sometimes necessary. In this way, The Wrestler shows how the
expectations of the audience who endorses a person's performatively constructed identity
are often internalized and enacted to an incongruous extreme by that person.5
Importantly, although the violence is real, the hatred the wrestlers show for each
other in the ring is not. This performance of inauthentic emotion is another area where
Cassidy relates to Randy. The key difference between their performances exists is Randy
fakes a negative emotion, whereas Cassidy fakes a positive emotion. A.O. Scott in his
review of The Wrestler for The New York Times describes this distinction between Randy
and Cassidy’s performances. He writes:
Randy and Cassidy (it’s not her real name, either) are both
performers, both expert at faking something the customers
desperately want to believe is real. The wrestlers don’t really hate
one another, and the stripper doesn’t really love you. (Scott,
emphasis mine)
According to Scott then, Randy’s love for Cassidy is problematic because Randy is her
customer, and her job is to make her customers believe she loves them. Thus, if Randy
wants Cassidy to really love him back, he needs her to give up her performative identity
as a false lover. Interestingly, it is only after the especially gruesome second match in the
film causes Randy to have a heart attack and to contemplate giving up his performative
identity that he wants Cassidy to love him—ergo, to give up her performative identity.

5

This point will be expanded on in the third chapter of this thesis.
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Randy actually tries to quit wrestling after this match (the second match of the
film). This match highlights Randy’s submission to the whims of the audience and the
violence that submission causes. It is a “hardcore” match: a match where the wrestlers
use a variety of household objects and weapons to hurt one another. In this way, this
match shows the brutal reality of Randy’s performative identity. The film focuses on one
feature of this match in particular: the use of a staple gun. Randy’s opponent in this
match, Necro Butcher (Dylan Keith Summers), suggests this grisly element. Randy asks
if the staples hurt. Necro, who, according to Richard Corliss, looks like “an angry Ozark
farmer,” states “not so bad going in . . . but pulling them out, they’re gonna’ leave a
couple little holes, a little bit of blood loss” (Corliss). The two men piercing each other
for the viewing pleasure of the masses exaggeratedly expresses the biblical symbolism of
their bloody sacrifice. However, more subversively, the violent display cannot be faked
and is really painful for both men. The audience in this case actually expects real
violence from them. Provocatively, the extra-diegetic audience—the audience that
watches the film—cannot be distinguished from the diegetic audience—the match’s
audience—in regards to the reality of the violence it observes: the lived actors in The
Wrestler actually staple each other.
The film’s display of the men putting staples in each other and later having them
removed contrasts shockingly with Necro’s casual description of the pain the staples will
cause. The film inverts graphic images of the staples going into the men and the staples
being ripped out. For example, immediately after a medic removes a stapled five-dollar
bill from Necro’s forehead with pliers, the camera cuts to a shot of Necro in the ring as he
staples the bill to his head. The juxtaposition of violence in the ring with the nauseating
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medical assistance after the match creates a tapestry of pain both in performance and
recovery. The next moment this inverted intercutting occurs is after Necro hits Randy
with a chair outside the ring. The ominous high-pitched whine that occurs when Randy
cuts himself in the first match accompanies Necro’s blow and leads directly to a shot of a
medic pulling out a particularly deep staple from Randy’s back. Randy’s mental state at
this moment is utterly different than it is after his first match. After the first match,
Randy is sharp, witty, and calm: like he’s coming off a high. After this match, during
this more visceral and painful treatment, Randy is nervous, jittery, and scared—he is
deeply troubled. The expression on Randy’s face reveals that this match was too much
for him to handle; although he needs to impress the audience to construct his
performative identity, in this moment he knows doing so has cost him dearly. After the
medic finishes taking the staples out of Randy's broken body, Randy feebly walks
towards the showers, grips his left arm, vomits, and collapses as his heart gives out on
him.
Randy is physically and emotionally fragile after his heart attack. He is at his
most vulnerable in the hospital because he has to face the reality that his performative
identity (i.e., his shield against emotional pain) is killing him. Randy’s desire for his
doctor to call him by his stage name after his heart attack reveals the depth of his
dependence on his performative identity. When the doctor, Dr. Moayedizadeh (Armin
Amiri), first enters Randy’s room in the hospital he calls him “Mr. Ramzinsky.” In
response, Randy quickly tells the doctor to call him “Randy.” During the initial
interaction, Randy faces away from the doctor. He literally doesn’t want to face his
problems. Randy quietly agrees to everything his doctor tells him to do until his doctor
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tells him he has to moderate his exercise. After this recommendation, Randy faces the
doctor for the first time and states, “Doc, I’m a professional wrestler.” This line is more
than just a statement of fact about Randy’s occupation: the pained expression on Randy’s
face, the severity of the situation, and Randy’s incessant demand to be called by his stage
name combine in this moment to show his absolute commitment and dependence on his
performative identity. Dr. Moayedizadeh tells Randy to stop wrestling. He states, “you
[Randy] almost died.” However, for Randy, the choice of death or not wrestling is one in
the same. Without wresting, Randy is not “Randy.” He is Robin Ramzinsky, a
nonperformative mess of a man with no friends, family, or meaningful identity. Thus,
Randy’s doctor presents him not with options, but courses of self-destruction.
The success of Randy’s attempt to abide by his doctor’s recommendation and
retire from wrestling depends on his ability to satisfy his need for positive attention in the
real world. The first person he goes to see is Cassidy. Randy’s choice to see her first
demonstrates how important she is to him. She suggests that Randy should reach out to
his estranged daughter, Stephanie (Evan Rachel Wood). Randy is an absentee parent,
always choosing wrestling over his child. However, because Cassidy recommends
visiting Stephanie, he goes to see her. Randy’s broken relationship with his daughter
reveals why he prefers the unconditional positive attention his performative identity
provides him over the trials and tribulations of the nonperformative world. During this
first interaction with Stephanie, it is clear that she will not provide Randy with the
positive attention and love he needs. She berates Randy for wanting her to take care of
him. She states:
Where the fuck were you when I needed you to take care of me?
And on all my birthdays which you never even made one – you
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probably don’t even know when it is. So, you know what? I don’t
care if you had a heart attack. Fuck you.
Randy’s performative identity doesn’t require the reciprocity a traditional relationship—
like the relationship between a father and his daughter—does. His performative identity
involves a purely self-indulgent relationship: his fans give him positive attention without
him ever really knowing them let alone giving them attention. This selfish construction
consumes and precludes his ability to maintain, let alone mend, a normal, functional
relationship.
After Stephanie explicates Randy’s absenteeism as a father, he returns to Cassidy
who takes an interest in the conflict. Cassidy's attention empowers Randy to fix his
relationship with his daughter. In this way, she becomes the sole source of positive
attention in Randy’s nonperformative life. He sees her as the path to success without the
audience and his performative identity. She agrees to help Randy buy a gift for Stephanie
in an attempt to reconnect with her. This act of kindness makes Randy redouble his
efforts to succeed in the nonperformative world. Because Cassidy shows even this small
interest in Randy’s life, he becomes a happier person—even at his job at the grocery store.
The gift Cassidy helps Randy pick out for Stephanie even manages to put their
relationship back on the right track. Randy’s relationship with Cassidy reaches a climax
when she agrees to have a beer with him outside of the strip club, and they kiss. This
intimate gesture gives Randy the impression that he is truly loved. This moment is also
(ironically) the breaking point for their relationship and starts Randy down the path
towards returning to his performative identity.
Cassidy rejects Randy’s love after this intimate moment in an attempt to protect
herself from being emotionally vulnerable. A key part of Cassidy’s performative identity
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as a stripper is to feign love, but never to fall in love. If Cassidy actually loves one
customer, she won’t be able to provide the same quality of performance to another.
Moreover, if she really loves a customer that would require her to invest herself in a
person who is typically a transient figure in her life which would make her at risk to be
hurt. Randy isn’t this kind of customer, but Cassidy cannot allow herself to be open to
that kind of risk regardless. She has bigger plans for herself than becoming involved with
a patron of the strip club: she has her sights set on moving out of town with her son and
starting a new life. Hence, she has to treat Randy like any other customer. When he
comes to see her at the club after their kiss, she pulls her hand away when he tries to hold
it and tells Randy “the real world and the club don’t mix.” This infuriates Randy and
causes him to degrade Cassidy by throwing money at her and demanding a dance. Randy
states, “I’m a paying customer and I want a dance.” She refuses, which reveals both that
Randy isn’t just a paying customer to Cassidy, and that her explanation that she can’t love
Randy because she can’t get involved with customers is a bluff.
Cassidy’s rejection of Randy causes him to return to his performative identity
functionally eliminating his chance for success and happiness in the nonperformative
world. After security kicks him out of the strip club for harassing Cassidy, Randy
chooses to go out with some of his wrestling friends and ends up doing drugs and having
sex with a young woman whose interest in him is solely the result of a poster of Randy
from his peak performative years on her brother's wall. Basically, she only gives Randy
attention and physical affection because of his performative identity and, as a result, can
be seen as an extension of his diegetic audience. Unfortunately because of the long night
out, Randy misses a dinner date with Stephanie, irreparably destroying his chance at
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reconciliation with her. Stephanie tells him, “I never want to see you again.” Thus,
without Cassidy’s love and attention, Randy loses his fragile chance at redemption in the
nonperformative world, and he returns to wrestling for one last match.
The final match of the film demonstrates the enormity of the audience’s influence
on Randy’s decision to return to the performative world and on the construction of his
performative identity. Before Randy’s last match, he gives a speech in which he
describes his unbreakable dependence on and need for the audience. Randy addresses the
crowd:
I just want to say to you all tonight I’m very grateful to be here. A
lot of people told me that I’d never wrestle again. And that’s all I do.
You know, if you live hard, and you play hard and you burn the
candle at both ends you pay the price for it. You know, in this life
you can lose everything that you love and everything that loves you.
Now I don’t hear as good as I used to and I forget stuff and I ain’t as
pretty as I used to be. But goddamn it I’m still standing here, and
I’m the Ram. . . as time goes by, they say, ‘he’s washed up. He’s
finished. He’s a loser. He’s all through.’ But you know what? The
only ones who are gonna tell me when I’m through doing my thing
is you people here. You people here are the ones who are worth
bringing it for, because you’re my family. I love you all so much.
Randy accepts the terms and conditions of his addiction to his performative identity. He
knows what it has cost him, and he knows that the audience is all he has left. He loves
them and sees them as his family. In an interview with TheCinemaSource.com, Mickey
Rourke explains this last speech as Randy’s appeal for a second chance he knows he
won’t get:
You know, it [the speech] was kind of shameful, in a way. Nobody
wants to admit that they screwed up so badly with their life, and
you’re left alone and yesterday’s news. If you’ve been there, and
I’ve been there, it’s no picnic. Randy wants one more chance, and
he ain’t gonna get it. (Rourke 3-4)
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So when Randy starts to have chest pains towards the end of the match, he makes an
active choice to continue the match and perform his finishing move one last time
(knowing full well that it will kill him) as a sacrifice to his only support group: the
audience.
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The Audience and the Performative Identity
In her review of Black Swan for the New York Times, Manohla Dargis describes
the film as a “tortured-artist drama” and “sleazy exploitation cinema” (Dargis). These
two labels apply equally well to The Wrestler. Both films show how it is the audience
that allows a performer to construct his or her performative identity. Both films
insidiously demonstrate how a person who is dependent on his or her performative
identity needs the attention the audience gives them for validation. Black Swan and The
Wrestler show the negative effects of the performative construction of identity. These
films portray the audience as culpable in these maladies. Butler’s theory that identity is
constructed through performance doesn’t explicitly describe the audience’s influence in
this way. However, these films show that performance can only produce a corresponding
character trait or identity if there is an observing party who confirms that performance
and gives it significance. Problematically, this observing party—the diegetic audience in
the case of both of these films—can influence a person to construct a performative
identity that causes her to inflict harm on herself or others.
Both Randy’s and Nina’s performative identities physically and emotionally
damage them. They both fail to have positive relationships in the nonperformative world
because of these identities. They hurt themselves to achieve success in the performative
world and, ultimately, they die in order to entertain their audiences. The audience may
not actively desire Randy and Nina to harm themselves or commit suicide; however, the
positive reception Randy and Nina receive from their audiences enables these negative
consequences nonetheless. If the audience didn’t exist and didn’t give positive support to
Randy and Nina, would they be able to construct the self-destructive performative
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identities they do? At the very least, the possibility seems absurd. The audience’s
positive attention allows Randy and Nina to neglect the nonperformative world. This
neglect makes the nonperformative world unbearable and painful for both of them
effectively forcing them into their addictions to their performatively constructed identities.
The audience allows Randy and Nina to transcend the nonperformative world, liberating
themselves from “earthly toils” (Kracauer 72). The result here is that these characters
rise up above the “constitutive ambiguity of everyday situations” (Barthes 5). The
audience supplies the high that Randy and Nina seek in their addiction to their
performative identities. They glorify Randy's and Nina’s performative identities and
make them worth dying for: these performers both literally and figuratively sacrifice
themselves for the audiences who experience and confirm their performative identities.
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Chapter 2: On the Job
Lars von Trier’s Antichrist (2009) and Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker (2008)
explore the relationship between the performative construction of identity and the
audience in the arena of the workplace.6 Both films focus on a person who is highly
successful at a job that requires them to ameliorate a harmful (or potentially harmful)
situation. In Antichrist, the focus is on He7 (Willem Defoe), an experienced
psychotherapist, who treats his own wife (Charlotte Gainsbourg) after the death of their
son Nic (Storm Acheche Sahlstrøm). He justifies his controversial decision to treat his
wife because of his history of occupational success. Problematically, He only connects
with his wife through treating her as his patient. Moreover, he only addresses their son’s
death as the initial trauma that triggers his wife's mental illness, not as a personal tragedy
in its own right. In The Hurt Locker, the focus is on Sergeant First Class William James
(Jeremy Renner), an American explosives expert, who defuses improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) in Iraq. James’s success at defusing IEDs is unparalleled although his
methods and demeanor are unorthodox and dangerous. The film portrays James as a man
who needs nothing in his life except war. As a result, James volunteers to abandon his
wife and young son repeatedly in order to do the job he has so much success at. Because
of their exceptional occupational success, both He and James neglect the other facets of
6

It is important to note the distinction between the workplace in Antichrist and The Hurt Locker, and the
performative world in Black Swan and The Wrestler. Obviously, Nina and Randy are professionals and the
performative world is their workplace; however, their occupations are typically viewed as performances.
The characters examined in this chapter, He and James, have occupations that are not normally conflated
with performance. Their jobs are practical endeavors, whereas Nina Randy's jobs are more readily seen as
aesthetic performances.
7

There are only three named characters in Antichrist: He, She, and Nic. Throughout this chapter I will
refer to He as ‘the man’, ‘the husband’, and ‘the therapist’ interchangeably. I will also refer to She as ‘the
woman’, and ‘the wife’.
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their lives. In the films, both men construct their identities by performing the duties
required of their jobs time and time again. In this way, they exemplify the Butlerian
performative construction of identity, wherein “performance repeats itself to institute the
effect of identity” (Butler 1718). As I argued in the first chapter, performative identities
require a kind of audience to legitimize them through observation. Since they construct
their identities through occupational performances, the audience for He and James is
larger and more amorphous than the audiences for Randy and Nina in chapter one.
Society at-large confirms their performative identities through a kind of mediated,
indirect observation.
Antichrist and The Hurt Locker highlight the relationship between the
occupational performative ‘space’ and society, which is both the observer and creator of
that performative arena. As addressed in the first chapter of this thesis, Black Swan and
The Wrestler are concerned with performative identities that manifest as a result of events
or performances that are produced solely for an observing audience. However, as I will
show in this chapter, Antichrist and The Hurt Locker are concerned with performative
identities that, while observed, are primarily produced to address vital social issues (in
the case of these two films, treating mental illness and reducing harm in armed conflicts).
In other words, both films transform the 'societies' of each respective man into implicit
diegetic audiences. Moreover, society’s observation of these men's occupational
performative identities is done in an indirect way. Society learns about the results of a
therapist’s treatment or a soldier’s duty through news stories, public statements, legal
proceedings, and other mediated, indirect ways—the public doesn’t sit in on a therapy
sessions or battles. Consequentially, this clandestine (diegetic) observation in these films
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has a much more subtle effect on He and James than that of Nina's and Randy's
physically present audiences.
The most important yet understated effect of society’s observation and
confirmation of the performative identities James and He construct is the conferment of
status. The duties and actions of soldiers and therapists have mortal significance—lives
hang in the balance. Society has a vested interest in the success of these occupations
because its continuity depends on it. That is, without mentally healthy citizens and a
country safe from enemy aggressors, society’s existence is highly vulnerable. As a result,
society elevates the status of these occupations, which ensure its continuity. The elevated
status of these occupations encourages people who have these jobs to conflate their work
and their identities. Society instructs these people that their work is important, and so
they are important too. In He’s and James’s cases, not only do they conflate their work
and their identities, they construct their identities through their work. Both men frame
their personal problems in the context of their work: for He, his wife’s mental instability
is not a major personal issue, but an opportunity for him to revalidate his performative
identity; for James, a nearby bomb is not a serious threat to his life, but a chance for him
to reconstruct his performative identity. Moreover, both men neglect and reject personal
connections to their families in order to maintain the objectivity required to construct
their occupational performative identities successfully. Therefore in He’s and James’s
cases, society’s observation encourages them to conflate their work and their identities as
well as to adopt a parochial, occupation-based perspective that excludes their families
and their personal problems. In other words, society motivates both men to care only
about their work and to ignore everything else in their lives.
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Butler’s understanding of performativity does not account for the immense
influence and power an audience like society exerts on individuals whose performative
identities are necessary for that audience’s survival. As I argued in the first chapter of
this thesis, Butler’s theory does not fully address the integral role audience plays in the
construction of performative identities. In this chapter, I show how an implicit diegetic
audience’s influence can cause the construction of overtly problematic performative
identities even if that audience isn’t literally present on screen for the extra-diegetic
audiences to see. Furthermore, I show that the problematic nature of those identities can
be a necessary consequence of constructing such an identity successfully. I use the
audience-performer relationship that exists between society and the societally-important
occupations of the psychotherapist and the soldier in Antichrist and The Hurt Locker
(respectively) to explicate these points.
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Antichrist: He
Antichrist tracks the course of a psychotherapist’s treatment of his wife’s grief
after the death of their young son. The film is divided into six distinct sections that are
marked by title cards. They are: “Prologue”; “Chapter One: Grief”; “Chapter Two:
Pain (Chaos Reigns)”; “Chapter Three: Despair (Gynocide)”; “Chapter Four: The Three
Beggars”; and “Epilogue.” The first two chapters of the film describe the therapist’s
treatment of his wife. The third and fourth chapters describe his wife’s negative response
to this treatment. In these latter chapters, the wife briefly improves only ultimately to
succumb to her mental illness. She improves immediately after He learns that She might
have indirectly caused their son’s death. She then descends into madness because she
believes that her husband is going to leave her after he subtly confronts her about his
suspicions. In the end, He fails to improve his wife’s condition because he approaches
her illness from the logical, objective perspective society requires of his occupational
performative identity, which forces him to disregard the way his more intimate role as her
husband undermines these qualities.
Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen argues in her essay “Antichrist—Chaos Reigns:
the Event of Violence and the Haptic Image in Lars von Trier’s Film” that the man’s
parochial perspective is necessitated by an innate kind of rationalism. Thomsen notes
that the film uses a Venus symbol (♀), which traditionally represents the female-gender,
to stand in for the “t’s” in the title. In this way, Thomsen establishes that the wife is the
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Nietzschean ‘antichrist’8 in the film, which makes her a representative of Dionysian
carnality. She writes:
Nietzsche confers on Anti-Christ the untamed natural, Dionysic
forces that in Greece in the antiquities constituted the dark side of
the Apollinic order. Where Apollo, the god of sculpture, represented
structure, marked boundaries, plastic forms, images, conscience,
thought and concepts, all that would contribute to what we today
with one word call ‘‘individuation,” Dionysos, the god of wine,
represented the unbound, timeless, the lack of image and reflection,
music, intoxication, but also will, which interestingly enough is
physical, not metaphysical . . . in addition to this opposition there
is yet another opposition, namely that of male and female, as the
Dionysian motif in Nietzsche is more conventionally feminine than
masculine. (Thomsen)
Essentially, He embodies Apollonian idealism whereas She represents the Antichrist and
Dionysian empiricism. Therefore, He approaches She’s mental instability from a
fundamentally incompatible worldview. Thomsen further argues that Antichrist
structurally expresses this incompatibility: “where the first two . . . chapters without
difficulty can be related to different stages in the psychoanalytic therapy to which the
man subjects the woman, the third chapter, Despair: Gynocide represents the very
opposite of psychic healing in an individualistic psychological perspective” (Thomsen).
In other words, the narrative initially progresses according to the stages of the man’s
prescribed therapy, which is a product of his societally-reinforced Apollonian idealism,
only to be undermined by the woman’s negative response to that therapy, which is itself a
8

I agree with Thomsen’s reading of the film in this regard and I acknowledge the film's inherent
misogyny in framing the woman in this way. However, I do not find the reading of Antichrist as purely
misogynistic to do justice to its thematic complexity. While the film does invite this reading, it also
criticizes the man’s attempt to treat his wife since he fails to rehabilitate her successfully. As a result,
Antichrist cannot be successfully defended as either a fully misogynistic or feminist work. Because of this
ambiguity, I am deliberately not addressing its gender politics. A more comprehensive analysis of the
misogynist/feminist undertones in the film can be found in Xan Brooks’s article for The Guardian,
“Antichrist: a Work of Genius or the Sickest Film in the History of Cinema?”
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consequence of her incompatibility with that idealism. Antichrist cinematically
explicates the incompatibility of the worldview entailed by the man’s performative
identity and the woman’s worldview by presenting He and She as unequal throughout the
film. However, the prologue of the film suggests that they might have been equals with
compatible worldviews had the man not constructed a performative identity as a therapist.
The prologue of the film presents He and She in an egalitarian frame, or a frame
in which they appear to be equals. In the first scene, they are having sex when Nic falls
out of the window in their apartment and dies. Throughout this scene, there is no sound
except for Handel’s “Lascia ch’io pianga.” The lack of dialogue in conjunction with the
dominance of the film’s score emphasizes the equality of the man and the woman. Since
neither character speaks, both characters’ inner thoughts are inaccessible. As a result, the
film presents them both as subjects of the soundtrack. Additionally, the scene is shot in
black and white. The chiaroscurist quality of the scene renders the man and the woman
visually similar. Finally, the fact that they are having sex physically embodies their unity
and similarity as they are engaged in the same activity and appear to have the same
passion for one another. Altogether, this opening montage constructs an evenly balanced
image of He and She.
This initial introduction of He and She as essentially equal characters incorporates
Butler's desire to reformulate feminism in such a way that it no longer focuses on the
oppression of women by men, but on the violence that results from the binary
categorization of gender-identities themselves. She writes, “As feminists, we have been
less eager . . . to consider the status of the category itself and, indeed, to discern the
conditions of oppression which issue from an unexamined reproduction of gender
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identities which sustain discrete and binary categories of man and woman” (Butler 523).
Here, Butler argues that feminists' focus on the differential treatment of men and women
as discrete identity categories actually contributes to gender as a source of “necessary
trouble” (Butler 1708). Thus, Antichrist's gender-equal prologue counteracts the
misogyny in its title card in a Butlerian fashion. Moreover, this prologue allows the
subsequent problems within the film to be seen not as the result of 'gender trouble,' but
issues that stem from the dialectic between the man's performative identity and the
reception that identity receives from the implied diegetic audience that observes the
man's performance.
The second scene of Antichrist (which is the first scene of “Chapter One: Grief”)
disrupts the equality the prologue creates between He and She. In this scene, He and She
are walking with the funeral procession for Nic. He is incredibly distraught and visually
animated as he trudges behind the hearse, which carries Nic’s coffin. She is completely
static, unmoved, almost frozen. A few moments after the scene begins, She collapses
overwhelmed by grief requiring her to be hospitalized. As She falls, He rushes to her side.
In this way, the film deconstructs the equality of the first scene because She is ill and He
is not. Moreover, He is visually grieving while She is visually neutral. The film expands
this deconstruction of the egalitarian perspective the prologue presents in the third scene
where She is in a hospital being treated for what her doctor (who is never shown)
describes as “atypical grief.”
In this scene, He visits She in the hospital and begins to critique the treatment She
receives. He explains that her doctor gives her too much medication—“way too much.”
She pleads with him to “trust others to be smarter than [him] just once.” He calmly
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responds that her doctor is “just out of medical school—he doesn’t know what he’s doing.
I’ve treated ten times as many patients as he has.” In turn, She states, “but you’re not a
doctor.” Her comment both expresses her frustration with her husband’s pretentiousness
and represents a challenge to his performative identity as a therapist. However, He
responds nonplussed: “No I’m not [a doctor] and I’m proud that I’m not when I meet a
doctor like him [his wife's doctor].” Their interaction highlights how the man’s
occupational performative identity is a source of conflict between him and his wife.
Moreover, it shows how the man's performativity identity doesn't depend on his wife
whatsoever.9 This conflict fundamentally deconstructs the egalitarian image the prologue
presents because the man’s performative identity establishes him as the expert and his
wife as his subject.
The man's diction in this moment demonstrates how his confidence as a therapist
is the product of his vast experience. In turn, his experience reveals how he constructs
his identity according to Butlerian performativity just like Nina and Randy do. Butler
writes: “performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves
its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a
culturally sustained temporal duration” (Butler xv). The man's statement that he has
treated “ten times as many patients” as his wife's doctor emphasizes his technical
superiority over her doctor; however, his decision to describe the relatively greater
quantity of patients he has treated also emphasizes how his performative identity as a
therapist is much more robust than the doctor’s occupational identity. Moreover, his
9

As will be discussed in chapter three, Tommy in The Fountain constructs a custodial identity that
depends on his wife as its diegetic audience. Like the man here, Tommy attempts to cure his wife's illness,
but he does so for very different reasons.
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assertion panders to society as a diegetic audience that has a desire for successful
therapists. Eventually, the man discharges his wife from the hospital so that he can treat
her illness himself. She initially opposes this action. In response, He says he loves her
and “nothing hurts worse than to see the one you love subjected to mistakes and wrongs.”
In other words, in his opinion, He can help her; her doctor can’t. He implies that he
won’t make the procedural and diagnostic errors her doctor makes. He claims that his
superior experience ensures that his medical opinions and decisions are going to be
successful—ergo, his occupational performative identity is the one society needs in this
case.
Before the man discharges his wife, she confesses to him that she feels
responsible for Nic’s death. The man reassures her that it is not her fault since he was
“there too [on the night of Nic’s death].” Therefore, she cannot be totally responsible
since he is equally blameworthy in this way. In response, She describes how she was
aware that Nic had the ability to crawl out of his crib, and so she still maintains she is
especially culpable. This admission and insight into his wife’s mental state gives the man
an avenue to explore through his treatment. He immediately applies his Apollonian logic
to the situation and assumes that this feeling of responsibility is the cause of his wife’s
mental illness. As Phillip French writes in his review of the film for The Observer, “he
[the man] attempts to allay his wife’s guilt over the boy’s death by . . . taking her on as
[his] patient” (French). French’s description of the man’s perception of the wife’s mental
state as guilty is especially illuminating. The man applies his vast experience as a
therapist to deduce what he thinks is a reasonable and accurate depiction of his wife’s
mental state: She is suffering from particularly acute grief because she feels guilty about
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the death of her son. This deduction appears sound so the man immediately starts
treating his wife as he would any other patient presenting with these symptoms. In this
way, he is performing as the ideal therapist: he trusts his instincts, and readily applies the
appropriate treatment. However, he fails to consider a more sinister reason for his wife’s
guilt—that she is, in fact, the cause of her son’s death. He ignores this potentiality
because it would require him to cross a boundary his Apollonian perspective depends
upon: the functional limit of his performative identity. That is, this potentiality would
imply that his wife isn’t sick and in need of his therapy, but malicious and evil. As noted
earlier in this chapter, the man comes to find out later in the film that his wife is actually
culpable in this way.
Returning once more the hospital scene, the final line of dialogue in the scene
reveals the man’s absolute faith in the success of his performative identity to be
problematic. He tells his wife that “no therapist can know as much about [her] as [he
does].” After he makes this remark, the camera zooms in on a vase containing flowers he
gave her earlier. The score becomes ominous and foreboding with strange, unsettling
noises as the camera reveals the roots of the plant are rotten and dying. This shot’s
juxtaposition with the man’s statement constructs the flowers as a symbol of his
perception of his wife. While it appears to the man that he knows a lot about his wife,
there is something in her that is murky, macabre, and hidden beneath the surface.
Considering that the man is completely ignorant of his wife’s psychotic nature, the
metaphor is entirely apt. Moreover, it captures the failure of the man’s performative
identity succinctly: he knows how to treat mental illness, but he doesn’t know his own
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wife. In Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Gilles Deleuze describes the inherent complexity
of knowing someone in social relationships:
Two people know each other, but already knew each other, and do
not yet know each other. Betrayal happens, it never happened, and
yet has happened and will happen, sometimes one betraying the
other and sometimes the other betraying the first all at the same time.
(Deleuze 101)
In other words, according to Deleuze, social constructs—like relationships or the
occupational performative identity the man constructs—are tenuous, conditional, and
unpredictable. A person has no autonomy over them. Moreover, they are often beyond
human comprehension precisely because they are inherently human. Deleuze’s point
underscores the man’s ignorance of both his wife’s true nature as well as the effects his
treatment will produce in her. The man’s Apollonian perspective can’t handle the
nebulous, constructed way in which Deleuze argues that a person ‘knows’ (or can’t know)
another person. So, the man ignores the possibility that he does not, in fact, know the
woman. The man’s ignorance of his wife causes the failure of his treatment, and further
emphasizes the flawed nature of his performative identity.
Antichrist’s depiction of the man’s actual treatment of the woman calls attention
to the differences between the two characters, and highlights the way the man detaches
from his role as her husband in order to be a better therapist. On the one hand, the film
presents the man as rational and calm. He is in control of everything. He is stable. On
the other hand, the film presents the woman as unnerved, wild, unpredictable, and
unintelligible. She is impenetrable, the embodiment of chaos. The film layers another
symbol on top of the two characters: in addition to being a prophet of Apollonian
idealism, the man represents humanity in that he perpetually strives to give order and
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meaning to his wife’s illness and the problems it produces; and, in addition to embodying
the Dionysian antichrist, the woman represents nature in the sense that she exists and
develops in ways that are erratic and capricious—she cannot be reasoned with.
Throughout the process, He establishes rules for her to abide by in an attempt to control
her behavior and, as a result, to control her illness. The first rule is no more medication.
He has her flush all the pills the doctor prescribed down the toilet. After she discards her
medicine, the camera cuts to a shot of her weeping loudly on the floor of her dead son’s
room. She tells the man “it hurts . . . I want to die too.” The man wears a face of stoic
neutrality (as he does throughout his treatment of the woman) and says, “I know; there’s
no way around that . . . [but] I’m not going to let you [die].” The man structures and
rationalizes every progression of the woman’s illness. He implies that her situation,
while terrible for her, is very much normal and within his control. She asks if the pain
she experiences will get any worse. He states, “yes, it will.” This statement confirms his
understanding of his wife’s condition, but it also signals his detachment from it. Even
though she is suffering, he does nothing to ease her pain—in fact, he does the opposite by
removing all the medication that would reduce her discomfort. He understands She is
suffering as his patient, but he doesn’t acknowledge that she is also suffering as his wife.
In this way, the objectivity his occupation requires supersedes his compassion as a
husband. Therefore, the film shows that the man does not treat the woman as his wife; he
treats her as his patient. Consequently, his identity is not an intimate construct to help her
specifically, but a broader construct designed to help anyone in her condition. He is a
societal resource—his occupational performative identity as a therapist is created for
everyone, a set of people to whom his wife happens to belong.
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During therapy, the woman describes the extent of the man’s detachment from her
and their relationship. She describes him as a man who has always neglected his family
to maintain a singular focus on his job. She states “you’ve always been distant from me
and Nic—now that I come to think of it, very, very distant . . . I’ve never interested you
until now that I’m your patient.” She goes on to criticize his affectless response to the
death of their son as well—“you’re indifferent to whether your child is alive or dead . . .
I bet you have a lot of clever therapist replies to that.” Again, this interaction illuminates
how the man's construction of his occupational performative identity fits the Butlerian
model of performativity. The woman’s diction when she uses the phrases “you’ve always”
and “I’ve never” highlights how he has exhibited this detachment and disinterest
repeatedly in the past; the man's objectivity in this situation is not the first and only
manifestation of his identity. Interestingly, the man’s response to the woman’s accusation
(that he is unaffected by his son’s death) does not attempt to refute her accusation. He
simply describes how his detachment in the past was to “honor [the woman’s] wish” to
have time alone to work on “her thesis”—a book project on misogyny and witchcraft.
Hence, he doesn’t deny his detachment from her or his son’s death—he rationalizes it.
The man goes on to rationalize the woman’s condition as well as his own behavior
throughout the rest of his treatment of her. As her grief transitions into “a new phase—
anxiety,” the woman becomes increasingly concerned that the pain she feels is
“dangerous.” The man reassures her this “new phase” is not dangerous; it is simply a
physical manifestation of her mental unrest. As the man describes the symptoms she will
experience, the film cuts to a montage of unfocused close-up shots of the different parts
of her body. Each shot corresponds to a particular symptom the man describes. In this
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way, the film visually demonstrates the man’s theory that the problem is not the woman
herself, but a malfunction of her body and mind. The man narrates his wife's symptoms
as the camera shows the images of her body. This montage implies he has control over
both the symptoms and her body. Later, in a moment that is both intimate and violent, he
“teach[es] [his wife] how to breathe” during particularly bad panic attack she has by
covering her mouth with his hand. The man’s action is physically domineering and
visceral. In order to heal the woman, he must control her—she must adopt the structure
he creates for her even in the way she breathes. Again, this moment highlights the
confidence and trust the man has in his therapeutic technique. He trusts that this very
violent and controlling action will produce positive effects. However, the moment also
reveals that the man must force his structure upon the woman—he must tame her in an
almost suffocating manner. The man’s control of the woman is inverted when they have
sex. Earlier in treatment when she attempts to have sex with him he instructs her: “never
screw your therapist no matter how much your therapist may like it . . . I know it
distracts you, but it’s not good for us.” Despite this instruction, the woman attempts to
have sex with the man again after she hurts herself during another panic attack. This time
he relents, and has sex with her. Afterwards, he grimaces and bitterly tells her that “this
won’t do . . . stupidest thing I could’ve done to you.” The man sees this action as
something he does to the woman. He doesn’t realize that she controls this sexual
exchange. She forces him to do this with her the same way he forces her to obey the
strictures of his treatment. Additionally, the woman’s disobedience of the man’s
instructions regarding sex reveals his inability to control her actions and her desires.
Hence, his therapy is not working.
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In spite of the evidence suggesting his therapy is failing to treat the woman, the
man presses on with the next phase of treatment. The man calls this phase “exposure.”
He maintains the only way to teach the woman that her “fear isn’t dangerous” is to
expose her to what she fears the most. In this case, she fears the woods surrounding a
cabin they own, which they call “Eden.” The rest of the film takes place at and around
this cabin. While at the cabin, the man uses a variety of different therapeutic exercises to
heal the woman. He uses hypnosis, role-playing, and environment interaction
simultaneously to expose the woman to her fear as well as to demonstrate the benign
nature of those fears. Each technique produces strange results: the woman appears to get
better, but the man becomes increasingly disturbed by her behavior and the area itself.
When the couple first arrives at the woods, the woman’s phobia is so strong that she
cannot stand on the ground because it feels like it’s burning to her. After several days of
treatment, she easily walks through the woods and lays down on the ground laughing.
The man arrives at the woods with the calm rationality he has in the couple’s apartment.
However, by the end of his treatment of the woman, the man is visibly unsettled by the
woods and the woman herself.
The man’s growing anxiety and the woman’s rehabilitation come unhinged when
the man confronts her with evidence that she may have abused their son. After the man
tells the woman that Nic’s autopsy report suggests he had a deformity in the bones of his
feet, he shows her a picture of Nic with his shoes on backwards. He asks her if she knew
that she had put his shoes on incorrectly. She claims that is must have been a “slip of the
mind that day.” However, the man has several other photographs of Nic on different
occasions with his shoes on in the same incorrect manner that he doesn’t show the
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woman. Additionally, the film shows a brief flashback of the woman forcing shoes
backwards on Nic’s feet as he cries. The scene implicitly suggests that the woman
contributed to her son’s fall and subsequent death by damaging his feet in this way. The
man walks out of the cabin and into a shed after the woman denies being aware of this
painful ‘mistake.’ Soon after he enters the shed, the woman comes in and attacks him,
knocking him unconscious, and piercing his leg with a drill as she repeatedly shrieks
“you’re leaving me, you bastard.” After the man regains consciousness, the woman is
completely psychotic. She tells the man she is going to sacrifice him to “the three
beggars,” deities from her research on witchcraft. The man manages to survive by
choking the woman to death. Anthony Lane in his review of Antichrist for The New
Yorker blames the man’s “civilizing science” for the woman’s descent into madness at
this stage of the film: “civilizing science, in other words, has done its duty and
withdrawn, allowing the bestial—that part of humanity which lies beyond the reach of
reason—to emerge and flex its jaws” (Lane). Put another way, the man’s logical
treatment provokes the woman’s insanity by bringing her to Eden, exposing her to her
fears, and interrogating her, but withdraws without a positive, practical solution.
The events that transpire in the “exposure” phase show the man’s treatment of the
woman to be simultaneously successful and unsuccessful. The man's treatment is
successful because it leads him to discover the actual nature of the woman’s mental
illness: she suffers from violent psychosis because she obsesses over the man leaving her.
However, the man’s treatment is also a failure because he can’t cure her of this psychosis
since he himself is an integral part of the obsession that exacerbates her illness. In this
way, the man’s occupational performative identity does violence to the woman because it
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draws out the magnitude of her illness without providing any viable sense of relief to it
other than her death. According to Joanna Bourke in Xan Brooks’s article for The
Guardian, “Antichrist: a Work of Genius or the Sickest Film in the History of Cinema?”,
“the man’s violence is the heartlessness of rationality . . . he is a rationalist cognitive
therapist, who bullies [the woman] into exposing her inner demons” (Brooks). In other
words, according to Bourke, the man’s violence stems from his “heartlessness” or his
emotional detachment, which his occupational performative identity requires. He
approaches the woman’s condition formulaically—as another performance that constructs
his identity—but he doesn’t consider that his status as her husband could preclude him
from healing her, which turns out to be the case. Brooks himself also describes the man
as “the arrogant, doomed advocate of order and reason” (Brooks). Sure enough, the
man’s arrogance—“no therapist can know as much about you as I do”—prevents the
success of his logical, Apollonian treatment. The man’s non-occupational status as the
woman’s husband is the problem, but his occupational performative identity and its
history of success require him to ignore this possibility until it is too late.
The important upshot of the performativity expressed in Antichrist is the
continuity of the man's performative identity as long as he and his diegetic audience
remain in tact. Over the course of the film, he loses his son and his wife, but his
performative identity lives on. The final sequence in “Epilogue” shows the man standing
on a hill as a myriad of faceless women walk through the woods towards him. This
image demonstrates how there will always be more patients for him to treat as long as he
is alive and there is a need for mentally healthy people. In this way, the film frames the
diegetic audience—even an implied diegetic audience—as an integral component to the
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continuity of the man's performative identity. As a result, the film highlights the dearth of
the audience in Butler's articulation of the performative construction of identity.
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The Hurt Locker: Sgt. William James
There is an important critical conflict surrounding the reception of The Hurt
Locker. According to a number of major film critics, it is an almost perfect war film that
shows the struggles and successes of soldiers in a complicated conflict. According to
soldiers, The Hurt Locker is a farce. The film portrays the business of being a soldier all
wrong. It glamorizes the job and in doing so misrepresents the dangers involved making
it seem like one man can win a war single-handedly for his country. Film critics A.O.
Scott of The New York Times and Richard Corliss of TIME Magazine rave about The Hurt
Locker’s ability to describe cinematically the American occupation of Iraq. Scott calls
the film “the best nondocumentary American feature made yet about the war in Iraq”
(Scott). Corliss praises the film as “a near-perfect movie about men in war, men at work”
(Corliss). In their reviews of The Hurt Locker, both Scott and Corliss describe the
ingenious way Bigelow creates tension and provides the adrenaline rush that moviegoers
seek when they choose to watch an action film. Their high praise for the film directly
conflicts with the severe criticism it receives from military experts in explosive ordinance
disposal, the profession the film portrays.
Michael Kamber, a journalist and videographer who embedded with an explosive
ordinance disposal (EOD) unit in Iraq during the American occupation of Baghdad,
stridently attacks The Hurt Locker for its highly unrealistic portrayal of the daily
operations of not only military explosives experts, but also soldiers’ duties in general.
Kamber describes how he normally avoids watching films about war and soldiers’ lives
because of their blatant inauthenticity; however, he says he chose to watch The Hurt
Locker because of the positive reviews it had received. He was disgusted with the film.
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He writes: “The film is a collection of scenes that are completely implausible — wrong
in almost every respect. This time, it’s not just minor details that are wrong” (Kamber).
Kamber’s main issues with the film concern its depiction of Sgt. First Class William
James. Kamber describes James’s actions as the most unbelievable and misleading
elements of the film:
If there is one rule with the military, it is that there is strength in
numbers. No one soldier, no one vehicle, goes out alone. Ever.
Four vehicles and a 20-man squad is the minimum that I have
worked with in Iraq. A lone Humvee would not be allowed to clear
the gate at any base in Iraq. Yet, in scene after scene, the bomb
disposal team, led by Staff Sgt. William James, appears to be
fighting the war alone . . . The movie’s denouement — the
explosive ordnance disposal (E.O.D.) team responds to a massive
truck bomb in the Green Zone — is so completely wrong in every
respect that it borders on farce. Insurgents did not operate freely in
the Green Zone. They would never have kidnapped a soldier in an
area with thousands of U.S. troops. And they would never have
hung around an active investigation scene with their weapons. No
American E.O.D. team in existence (or any other three-man squad)
would go charging alone down dark alleyways when there are
hundreds of infantrymen at hand . . . These are mere details
compared to the way Sergeant James repeatedly swaggers up to
bombs. As Mark Boal, the screenwriter, well knows, many I.E.D.’s
in Iraq are remotely detonated. Mr. Boal actually embedded with an
E.O.D. team in Iraq, so he knows the chances of recklessly
approaching even a single command-detonated bomb and surviving
are quite small. Yet we are made to believe that Sergeant James has
disabled over 800 bombs in this reckless, cowboy-like fashion . . .
More disturbing and implausible yet is the way the protagonist
repeatedly endangers the lives of his team members. (Kamber)
Kamber’s deconstructive analysis of The Hurt Locker demonstrates how the power of the
film doesn’t come from actual authenticity. Moreover, his analysis suggests the film
presents an idealized, non-real conception of ‘the good soldier’ in James.10 Importantly,
10

In Antichrist, the authenticity of the man's therapeutic techniques hasn't been investigated or written
about. However, given the film's overtly fantastical elements such as a talking fox and a tree that grows
human arms, it doesn't seem as though it would be appropriate to evaluate the film's realism.
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Kamber describes how James “repeatedly swaggers up to bombs” and “repeatedly
endangers the lives of his team members”—that is, even the most critical opinions of the
film still perceive the way James constructs his identity in a Butlerian way in the sense
that his identity is comprised of a series of distinct yet repeated performances11. This
shows that The Hurt Locker's remediates Butlerian performativity via James's
characterization.
The conflict between civilian critics and military experts in regards to the quality
of The Hurt Locker rests on each group’s understanding of the film’s perspective. As
noted above, military experts like Kamber are certainly correct in criticizing the film’s
authenticity. However, the cinematic quality of a war film has little to do with
authenticity. The Hurt Locker is authentic in visually superficial terms only: the film
looks very real. Yet, the film is primarily concerned with the effects of war on the lives
of individual men. The film explores the mental space where soldiers exist—it ventures
into the “hurt locker,” which, according the film’s screenwriter Mark Boal, is a slang term
used by soldiers in Iraq meaning a nebulous bad place a soldier ends up in after a
particularly bad conflict or explosion. In this way, the film isn’t attempting to be
rigorously authentic in the way the soldiers act or perform their duties. It strives to show
how their experiences affect them, and succeeds in this endeavor. Thus, the film is a
critical success because of its ability to crawl inside the psyche of these men at war not
because of its adherence to authentically representing combat.
The Hurt Locker’s focus on the psychological effects of war reveals the addictive
properties of the intense conflicts innately a part of war and juxtaposes those properties
11

Butler writes that features of a person’s identity are defined through “a stylized repetition of acts,”
which are “internally discontinuous” (Butler 179).
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with the features of peaceful civilian life. By contrasting these two experiences, the film
describes how soldiers can be either intensely repulsed by the bloody business of battle or
perversely attracted to the dangers of armed conflict. In order to convey these
psychological states cinematically, the film must not be hampered by military protocol
and authenticity because a great deal of actual modern combat is a lot of waiting
punctuated by brief, inexplicable moments of irrational and unintelligible violence. A
character like James who conflates his identity with his role as a soldier wouldn’t appear
brash or have a cowboy-like swagger about him, as Kamber puts it. However, in order to
explain his personality in a film, the character needs to possess traits that are overpronounced and exaggerated.
The Hurt Locker highlights James and his devil-may-care demeanor in order to
show how his identity is enmeshed with his role as a soldier. In this way, James is the
perfect soldier because he isn’t restrained by the mental and moral baggage that test the
other soldiers’ courage and commitment. James loves war—he lives for the thrill of
defusing a bomb or preventing an attack. He truly comes alive in armed conflict. War
has a bizarre and intriguing effect on James: while it shocks and disturbs the other
members of his team, war makes James happy. The Hurt Locker is thus a cerebral
interpretation of modern war and as such is more metaphorical than literal. The film
opens with a quotation from the American journalist and political activist Chris Hedges,
stating: “The rush of battle is often a potent and lethal addiction, for war is a drug.” The
sentiment behind this quote—that there is a pleasure to be gained from the hell of war so
powerful that is justifies a person’s participation and death in combat—sets the tone for
the narrative of the film, which can best be described as an admixture of panic and
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calculation. The Hurt Locker wants to explore the psyche of the soldier; it isn’t
concerned with the reality of the physical pageantry or maneuvers of combat. As the
quote fades from the screen, the end of the quote—“war is a drug”—is left lingering
before the next shot appears. This epigraph resonates with the film’s intrinsically critical
view of society’s need for the occupational performative identity of the soldier: society
enables and encourages individuals to construct a singular identity as a soldier to promote
its own ends even at the cost of the autonomy of those individuals. In this way, The Hurt
Locker makes a sidelong criticism of Butlerian performativity. Essentially, the film
makes the point that James's troubling performative identity is a product of society as an
implicit diegetic audience. Without society's need for and approval of James's repeated
performances as a soldier, he couldn't act that part—he couldn't construct that identity.
Significantly, James is starkly different than the other two soldiers on his team.
He is wild and humorous where they are serious and nervous. The film emphasizes the
personality clash between James and the other two men, Sergeant JT Sanborn (Anthony
Mackie) and Specialist Owen Eldridge (Brian Geraghty), in order to highlight James’s
superiority as a soldier. Sanborn and Eldridge are very normal soldiers: they fear for
their lives, they are cautious, and they adhere strictly to the proper procedure in every
conflict. James is, as Sanborn puts it, “reckless.” He does everything he can to be
successful even if that means ignoring the risks and the potential consequences.
The fundamental difference between the three men is their mental approach to war.
Sanborn and Eldridge count down the days until they can go home; James counts up the
number of bombs he has defused. A.O. Scott describes the differences between the men
aptly:

Semerad 66
Specialist Owen Eldridge is a bundle of nerves and confused
impulses, eager to please, ashamed of his own fear and almost
dismayingly vulnerable. Sgt. J. T. Sanborn is a careful,
uncomplaining professional who sticks to protocols and procedures
in the hope that his prudence will get him home alive, away from an
assignment he has come to loathe. The wild card is Staff Sgt.
William James, who joins Delta after its leader is killed and who
approaches his work more like a jazz musician or an abstract
expressionist painter than like a sober technician. A smoker and a
heavy metal fan with an irreverent, profane sense of humor and a
relaxed sense of military discipline, he approaches each new bomb
or skirmish not with dread but with a kind of inspired,
improvisational zeal. (Scott)
While all three men perform similar duties as soldiers, only James constructs his identity
through his occupational performance. It is hard to imagine James as anything but a
soldier because he is so effective and so joyous when he is defusing a bomb. The others
are trapped by their occupations, and it seems that they, like so many others, became
soldiers out of necessity, not desire.
The Hurt Locker prefaces James’s introduction to Sanborn and Eldridge with a
scene wherein their former explosives expert Sgt. Matthew Thompson (Guy Pearce) dies
during an IED explosion. The film uses this scene as a foil to James’s reckless, cowboylike approach to his work. Thompson, Sanborn, and Eldridge use a robot to identify the
IED before they attempt to disable it. James never uses a robot. Thompson works in
concert with Sanborn and Eldridge. James relies primarily on his own instincts and skills;
he often deliberately ignores Sanborn and Eldridge. Thompson has experience, but he is
still a careful soldier who fears for his safety and the safety of others. James has a great
deal of experience successfully defusing bombs and IEDs, and, as a result, approaches
every bomb with confidence (much in the same way that the man in Antichrist
approaches his wife as a new patient). Thompson’s humanity permeates his actions, no
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matter how courageous they are. James appears alien. Sure, he is courageous, but he is
also surgically precise and emotionally inert. He appears heroic in a stoic kind of way,
but he also appears impossible and inhuman.
The first two scenes in which James defuses IEDs present him as an obsessive
perfectionist. He is a veritable bomb genius, but he also operates like a needle junky
expertly wielding a syringe and belt strap. In the course of his actions, he endangers his
own life as well as the lives of Sanborn and Eldridge. James’s obsession—his
addiction—to defusing bombs comes to the fore in the second scene where he defuses a
set of bombs wired to a car. This scene emphasizes James’s recklessness as well as his
obsessive genius. First, James refuses to wear his bomb suit because “there’s enough
bang [in the car] to send us all to Jesus,” or so he tells Eldridge, implying that the suit
doesn’t add any measure of safety to the situation. Second, Sanborn informs James that
the entire area has been fully evacuated. He notes that the bomb can be safely detonated
by a team of army engineers without any casualties. Yet, James still continues to work on
defusing the bomb. James’s refusal to give up on the bomb leaves his team members to
wait longer than they have to in a hostile area. His tenacity also increases the likelihood
that he himself will be blown up in the car. He simply cannot give up on a bomb no
matter the circumstances. His belief in his talents and instincts is too strong and his
obsession too great to quit. After successfully disarming the bomb, Colonel Reed (David
Morse) asks James how many bombs he has disarmed. James knows the exact number:
“Eight hundred and seventy-three, sir.” Reed applauds James’s career and his success,
stating, “That’s just hot shit . . . that’s gotta be a record.” While Reed praises James
the camera cuts to Eldridge, one of the men whose life James unnecessarily puts in
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jeopardy, who looks down, dejected. In this interaction, Reed—the authority figure—
represents society and his praise confers status to James through his occupational
performative identity. James is “hot shit” because of the work he does repeatedly. This
moment captures succinctly the power of society as an audience over James’s
occupational performative identity. Since the authority present praises James not only for
his success in this one instance, but for his repeated success, it implicitly encourages his
addiction, the negative consequence of his occupational performative identity. Moreover,
the colonel isn't present to see the superfluity of the danger James's methods. In this way,
the film argues that the implied diegetic audience doesn't see the full performance, only
the results. Additionally, this audience doesn't care about the method in which the results
are obtained as long as the outcome matches their expectations. As a result, James's
implied diegetic audience is similar to Randy's present diegetic audience in that both
audiences have expectations for the performers they observe although they don't fully
realize what it takes for those performers to meet those expectations.12
James's extreme methods have a negative effect on both Eldridge and Sanborn
because they reveal his dangerous obsession and his cavalier regard for personal safety.
On the one hand, Eldridge fears James, and worries James’s actions will eventually kill
him before his tour is over. On the other hand, James challenges Sanborn’s authority.
Sanborn sees himself as the de facto leader of the team since Thompson died, and he sees
James’s actions not so much as dangerous, but as rebellious. Eldridge holds out hope that
Sanborn will save him from James, but it is obvious he knows James is in control. When
the army doctor visits Eldridge after a mission, Eldridge tells him “my team leader is
12

See my points about the authenticity of the violence in wrestling on pages 31-32.
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inspiring . . . he’s going to get me killed.” James’s negative effect on his team
members culminates in a short exchange between Sanborn and Eldridge while they are
remotely detonating charges in the desert. Sanborn hints that they should kill James. The
murder plot never comes to fruition, but the sentiment is there: James is a threat to their
lives. The threat manifests itself in one of the film’s later missions. James leads the other
two on a harrowing and spontaneous romp through the Iraqi streets causing Eldridge to
be non-fatally wounded when James misses his mark and shoots him. As Eldridge is
about to be airlifted on a helicopter home towards the end of the film, he blames James
for taking them out on an unnecessary manhunt just to get “[his] adrenaline fix.”
Eldridge and Sanborn have no effect on James whatsoever. He sees them only as
means to an end—that end being his ability to continue being a soldier. At times, they are
useful. In one scene, he guides Sanborn as he snipes several enemies who have opened
fire on them in the desert while he uses Eldridge to find ammo and other supplies.
Poignantly, there is a moment in this scene where James holds up a juice box for Sanborn
to drink from while Sanborn continues to look down the sights of his rifle. The image
doesn't captures camaraderie, but a master-slave dynamic. In heat of battle, Sanborn
doesn’t see James as a challenge, but as an expert who he must yield to. In this moment,
he acknowledges James’s superiority. Nonetheless, throughout this scene and all the
other scenes of the film, Sanborn and Eldridge are simply components of the job to James.
He doesn’t get any more upset or happy with them than a soldier would get over his or
her rifle or knife. Other people’s inability to affect or connect meaningfully with James
extends to his family.
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James has no emotional connection to the world away from war, what he sees as
the nonperformative13 world. During a night of drunken revelry, Sanborn finds a box of
James’s personal possessions. For the first time in the film, James looks very
uncomfortable. Inside the box, Sanborn finds a picture of James’s son. James doesn’t
say he misses his son or he loves him. All he has to say about his son is “he’s a tough
little bastard . . . nothing like me.” Sanborn then asks if James is married. He
describes his life at home as follows:
Well, you know, I had a girlfriend, and uh she got pregnant, so we
got married. We got divorced. Or, you know, I thought we got
divorced. I mean, she’s still living in the house, and she says we’re
still together, so I don’t know. What does that make her? I don’t
know.
During this short speech, the camera zooms in on James’s face. Again, this is the first
interaction where James seems unsettled, uncool. Notably, however, he doesn’t describe
any positive features of the people in his life at home except his wife’s loyalty. Sanborn
calls James’s wife “dumb” for being with him. James gets angry and almost shouts, “Hey
she ain’t fucking dumb, alright? She’s just loyal.” This scene exposes the fact that the
pinnacle of a person’s usefulness to James is loyalty and obedience. He applies the same
logic to the way he views his family as he does his coworkers. Such moments expose
that, for James, personal life is an absolute afterthought, which emphasizes how
thoroughly his identity and his occupation are intertwined.

13

In James's case, the nonperformative world is the non-diegetic world. That is, the arena of his life
within the film wherein he is not enacting or constructing his performative identity. Unlike Nina and Randy,
as noted in chapter one, James's performativity identity doesn't require a physical stage and a living,
breathing audience to be constructed. So his nonperformative realm is less explicit than Nina and Randy's:
it is the nebulous space where he cannot go about the business of soldiering.
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There is only one kind of person for whom James’s openly expresses affection:
bombmakers. After finding the picture of James’s son, Sanborn discovers a variety of
bomb components in James’s box. James explains that each object in the box is
something that “almost killed [him].” He shows Eldridge and Sanborn components to the
first two bombs he disarmed with them. When he shows them the “dead man’s switch”
to the bomb he defused after the area was completely evacuated he says alarmingly “this
guy was good . . . I like him.” It makes sense that a soldier like James would admire
and have affection for bombmakers because he would not be able to construct his
performative identity without them. Without the threat these faceless foes present,
society wouldn't need James to do his job. As a result, he wouldn't be able to construct
his occupational performative identity that he does. In this way, the men and women who
make IEDs—endangering many lives, and killing many more—necessitate James’s
performative identity in the eyes of his diegetic audience, society. Thus, bombmakers
are the only people who affect James. Although, in the film, there is one other person
who affects James: a foul-mouthed young Iraqi boy named Beckham (Christopher
Sayegh). Beckham sells James DVDs and horses around with him. James finds a young
boy whose body has been turned into a “body-bomb” and believes it's Beckham. This
causes him to venture out into the Iraqi streets at night to try to find the men responsible.
It is the only time he appears to care for another person, not just a bomb. As it turns out,
the boy James found was not Beckham despite his similar appearance and stature. This
misunderstanding highlights James’s skewed perspective—how much war has warped his
understanding. This moment also subtly points out how James's occupational
performative identity precludes his ability to acknowledge his identity as a husband and a
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father. His heroic efforts to seek justice for Beckham can be seen as a way to exorcise his
subconscious guilt over abandoning his son. James cannot allow himself to openly
acknowledge this guilt though. He never considers that he could have a life at home,
away from the carnage and the ambiguity of war.
Unlike James, Eldridge and Sanborn yearn for their lives at home, away from war.
Before Eldridge is flown out of Iraq, Sanborn states, “see you on the other side.” This
moment is shown in a series of two-shots. First, the camera shows Sanborn speaking
with James looking lost at his side. Second, the camera shows Eldridge stating, “alright”
and smiling as Sanborn embraces him one last time. The other side is a crucial concept
for most soldiers. It is a symbol of survival and a return to normalcy. Many men don’t
make it to that other side: home, away from battle and the constant threat of sudden
death. After one final close encounter with an Iraqi civilian wearing a vest of bombs,
Sanborn asks James how he handles the constant threat of death that comes with their job.
James states, “I don’t think about it.” James asks Sanborn, “do you know why I am the
way I am?” Sanborn replies, “No, I don’t.” The camera answers James’s question by
cutting to a scene of James at home walking through a grocery store. This now iconic
moment shows James absolutely consumed by the arbitrariness and meaninglessness of
this commonplace event. He stands alone overwhelmed by the cereal aisle. For James, if
this is all the other side has to offer, then he needs to go back to war. Caetlin BensonAllott describes this image in her article, “Undoing Violence: Politics, Genre, and
Duration in Kathryn Bigelow's Cinema,” as the moment when the film confirms James’s
addiction to war. She writes:
In the much-discussed shot of James standing alone in a
supermarket aisle, having returned from his tour of duty, his
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blankness is again emphasized: he is utterly disconcerted by its
plethora of breakfast cereals. As the film tells us, “war is a drug,”
and this is a man suffering withdrawal symptoms, ready to return to
his addiction. (Benson-Allott 43)
Like Nina in Black Swan, James constructs a perfect performative identity. Unfortunately,
as a soldier, that means he cannot function in a peaceful environment: he needs
conflict—he needs war. A.O Scott writes, “Eldridge is a decent guy, dangerously out of
his element but making the best of a bad situation. Sanborn is a professional, doing a job
conscientiously and well. But James is something else” (Scott). Unlike the other soldiers,
James is addicted to his performative identity as a soldier. In one shot after he
accidentally shoots Eldridge, the camera shows James showering in his full uniform
washing the blood away. This image is The Hurt Locker at its most cerebral and most
metaphorical: underneath it all, James is a soldier. When he strips down for a shower, he
leaves his uniform and his gear on. He is a genius in the arena of violence, and as such
he has no place in the world away from war. Richard Corliss calls James’s unique
abilities “creepy”: “It's a creepy marvel to watch James in action. He has the cool
aplomb, analytical acumen and attention to detail of a great athlete, or a master
psychopath, maybe both” (Corliss). Indeed James's performative identity is creepy or
unsettling much in the same way Nina, Randy, and He are unsettling in their performative
identities. Each character is disturbing because they seem so doggedly stuck in these
identities. They are compulsive creatures unable to break away from the behaviors that
define them in the eyes of their (diegetic) audiences. To this end, The Hurt Locker
concludes with James returning for another tour of duty, an addict relapsing unable to
stomach life as a father and husband without the high of war.

Semerad 74
James’s ultimate return to war both confirms his addiction to his performative
identity and reiterates his status as the perfect soldier. In doing so, this moment also
condemns the perfect soldier. The perfect soldier is a necessity of the modern military
industrial complex, which is itself a necessity of modern society. If the perfect soldier
must abandon his or her family in order to construct an identity of conflict and violence,
and society needs perfect soldiers, then society causes these people to abandon and to
neglect their families. In this way, like Nina, Randy, and He, James is not in control of
his identity; his audience is.
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Chapter 3: At Home
Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (2011) and Darren Aronofsky’s The Fountain (2006)
investigate the manner in which performative identities can be necessitated by the
behavioral expectations that certain individuals expect themselves to uphold for their
families. As with the protagonists of the other four films examined in this thesis, the
protagonists of these two films maintain identities constructed in a Butlerian performative
fashion—that is, their identities are social constructions created through the repetition of
certain defining actions for either explicit or implicit diegetic audiences. Moreover, these
protagonists perceive their families as the audiences that legitimize, confirm, and
authenticate their performative identities; their families represent the “public” that
enforces the “social laws” that shape their performances (Butler 526). Melancholia and
The Fountain demonstrate the destabilization of the performative identity that occurs
when that audience or “public” is mortally threatened. Furthermore, these films lay bare
how the performative identity, as a “social temporality,” collapses with the death of the
audience (Butler 179).
In both films, the protagonist’s family is about to die. In The Fountain, Tommy
Creo’s (Hugh Jackman) wife Izzie (Rachel Weisz) has an aggressive brain tumor that
ultimately kills her. Tommy, a cancer researcher, spends the last few days of Izzie’s life
attempting to find a cure for her disease. In Melancholia, all life ends when a large blue
planet called Melancholia collides catastrophically with the Earth. Claire (Charlotte
Gainsbourg) spends the days leading up to the collision attempting to prepare for the
apocalypse while hoping it will not happen. Her external, impersonal actions strive to
anesthetize the apocalypse. In the end, she fails to effect any change in her own or her
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family’s fate. In both cases, Tommy and Claire fail to connect meaningfully with their
loved ones in the last few opportunities they have. Their inability to connect with their
families in these final moments stems from their failure to accept that their families—
their diegetic audiences—are going to die, as this acceptance would entail losing their
performative identities.
In Melancholia, Claire is a staunch pragmatist and rationalist. She has intuitive
anxiety concerning the possible collision of Melancholia and Earth, but she defers to her
husband’s scientific expertise. Despite this deference, she takes several precautions in
case her intuition is correct: she purchases a bottle of pills so that she and her family can
die painlessly, and she has her sister Justine (Kirsten Dunst) stay at her house so her
whole family can be together in the end. Claire believes that with the proper preparation
she can maintain a semblance of order in the face of the apocalypse. In the end, Claire’s
practical efforts are futile and her calm pragmatism crumbles. Throughout the film,
Claire attempts to be the bastion of order in her family. She constructs her performative
identity through her actions as the stable caretaker of her family. However, this identity
is nothing more than a superficial artifice when the world literally comes crashing down
around her. Interestingly, Justine, who overtly fails to maintain a performative identity,
transcends the calamity that occurs.14
In The Fountain, Tommy neglects Izzie in order to attempt to save her life
because, without her, his performative identity as her lover will be undone. The film

14

It's not that Justine survives this disaster, but that Justine embraces the end of her life and revels in it,
unlike Claire who is consumed by panic and anxiety in the final moments of her life. Thus, Justine
transcends the horror of her own death whereas this terrible consequence destroys Claire's identity as well
as her physical body.
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makes Tommy out to be the perfect lover; however, the film also makes the paradoxical
point that the perfect lover cannot be a perfect lover because he can’t accept his love’s
mortality—he can’t accept her humanity. In this way, Tommy’s performative identity
takes precedence over Izzie herself. As a result, Tommy harms both himself and Izzie by
squandering the last few opportunities he had to be with her. Tommy comes to regret his
abandonment of Izzie.
Tommy and Claire are presented as supererogatory members of their families.
Tommy doesn’t just help his wife attend chemotherapy—he searches for a cure for her
cancer. Claire doesn’t just maintain the order of her family’s lives after a disastrous
wedding—she also upholds the structure and normalcy of their lives in the face of the
apocalypse. In these ways, both characters exceed their families' expectations for them.
However, the heightened expectations they strive to live up to are products of the social
environments in which they exist. Tommy just happens to be a cancer researcher whose
wife has cancer. Therefore, it is not out of the realm of possibility for him to be able to
help his wife by searching for a cure to her cancer. Moreover, because he feasibly could
cure his wife of her cancer, his actions might not be supererogatory for him although they
would be for a spouse without his background. Claire is married to a scientist whose
theory is that the world isn’t coming to an end. Additionally, Claire believes that the
practical measures she takes will mitigate the truly horrific consequences of the
apocalypse, if it occurs. Thus, her maintenance of the family’s stability is the result of
ignorance (albeit self-induced) of the ensuing calamity, not in spite of it. Hence, her
actions are not supererogatory whatsoever. In fact, she behaves in a singularly typical
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fashion for someone in her position in the sense that she behaves in accordance with the
information she believes to be true.
Just like the other four characters examined in this thesis, Tommy and Claire
construct their performative identities to meet the behavioral expectations of a kind of
audience—the diegetic audience. In Black Swan and The Wrestler, Nina and Randy
perform for an actual audience and attempt to satisfy the audience’s expectations to be
entertained. In Antichrist and The Hurt Locker, the man and James perform their duties
as professionals to fulfill the needs of an abstract, influential and always implied diegetic
audience—society—that confers status and value based on their occupational successes
as a therapist and a soldier respectively. In The Fountain and Melancholia, Tommy and
Claire construct their performative identities in a way that appeases a more intimate and
complex diegetic audience—their families. Tommy and Claire perceive their families as
audiences that expect either salvation or protection from suffering. However, the films
demonstrate that Tommy’s and Claire’s perceptions fundamentally misrepresent their
families’ expectations. Importantly, these films also emphasize how audience
expectations—perceived or real, present or implied—are the primary reason for the
construction of performative identities.
This chapter examines the relationship between the artificial, exaggerated
expectations Claire and Tommy construct their performative identities in response to, and
their loved ones’ actual, less grandiose expectations. Claire and Tommy maintain, to a
fault, the stricture that they must be the custodians of their loved ones’ mortality. They
cannot accept that they can’t control death: Tommy can’t accept that he can’t prevent
Izzie’s death, and Claire can’t accept that, if the world is ending and her whole family is
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going to die, she can’t give them a peaceful end. Their rejection of this lack of autonomy
causes them to be unprepared for the deaths of their loved ones. Thus, the seemingly
supererogatory actions they perform are done in vain. Significantly, the vanity of these
characters' actions reveals how these actions are actually attempts to prevent the complete
loss of their performative identities. The death of their families is not just a common
tragedy; it represents the destruction of their performative identities. In this way, the
threats made on the corporeal existence of their families, either by nature or by disease,
affect Tommy and Claire so powerfully because they threaten both of their performatively
constructed—and so audience-dependent—identities.
To articulate the entrenchment of Tommy's and Claire’s performative identities
with the existence of their families as audiences, both The Fountain and Melancholia
present family members as foils to these characters. Tommy’s wife Izzie and Claire’s
sister Justine accept mortality and do not try to fight it. Izzie, who is dying of cancer,
spends her time writing a book, stargazing, and embracing the prospect of her death. She
is scared, but she doesn’t try to avoid her mortality. Justine, who has a preternatural
awareness of events in the world and the future, comes to live with Claire and her family
days before Melancholia collides with Earth, as noted earlier. For Claire, Justine’s
presence makes the prospect less ominous—perhaps, she believes Justine can prevent the
apocalypse. Either way, in her time at Claire’s home, Justine embraces the end, even
going so far as to forecast its arrival. Both Izzie and Justine choose to welcome death,
much to the chagrin of Tommy and Claire, respectively. Ultimately, Izzie and Justine are
more satisfied and transcendent than Tommy and Claire. Whereas, Tommy and Claire
represent identities that are imprisoned by Izzie and Justine’s respective mortal bodies,
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Izzie and Justine exhibit identities that are liberated from the trials of their mortal bodies.
Unlike Izzie and Justine, Tommy and Claire cannot understand that anything positive
could result from the natural end of a single life or of the world because it signals the end
of their performative identities.

Semerad 81
Melancholia: Claire
During an interview with Vasu Reddy in Agenda, Judith Butler, talking about the
distinction between Freud’s definition of mourning and melancholia15, states that “the
melancholic is haunted and animated by a loss that he or she cannot name and cannot
grieve” (Butler 120). Butler argues that the defining feature of Freudian melancholia is
an innate and unexplainable sense of loss. In his review of Melancholia for the New York
Times, A.O. Scott argues that Justine embodies Freud’s diagnosis of melancholia:
“Freud’s diagnosis [of melancholia] pretty much captures the mental state of Justine, a
young woman whose history of crippling depression overshadows her lavish wedding
party and threatens to blight her chances at future happiness” (Scott). Applying Butler’s
claim, Scott’s assertion about Justine’s character is actually incorrect. While Justine is in
fact depressed, she can articulate the source of her depression. She explains, towards the
end of the film, “the Earth is evil; we don’t need to grieve for it.” In other words, Justine
is a misanthrope—her sadness and her antisocial tendencies stem from her perception of
humanity’s depravity. In this way, she does not satisfy Butler’s requirement for the
Freudian melancholic since she has a clearly defined sense of loss: Justine has lost her
compassion for the world at-large. Contrastingly, Claire fits Butler’s model, and, in
doing so, demonstrates my point that the performative identity ceases to exist without the
audience.

15

Freud writes: “The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection,
cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a
lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings,
and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (Freud 244).
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Throughout the film Claire repeatedly attempts to prevent the dissolution of her
family. Her commitment to this end reveals her adherence to Butlerian performativity:
she creates her performative identity as the glue that keeps her family intact. In this way,
like Tommy in The Fountain, Claire constructs her identity through a performance that is
bound to fail given the context of the film (the world is going to end; ergo, she cannot
maintain her family’s cohesion). While Tommy opposes his wife’s mortality, she
struggles against an entropy that consumes her family. As a result, the prospect of the
end of the world is more devastating and horrific for Claire than any other character in
the film because it signals the literal destruction of her family. Moreover, the death of her
family is the loss of her performative identity’s diegetic audience. As a result, it
necessitates the dissolution of that identity. Thus, Claire’s anxiety concerning the loss of
her family masks an additional concern: the loss of her audience.
This indirect, inexpressible sense of loss allows Claire to fulfill Butler’s
requirement for the melancholic, and exposes the interdependence between her
performative identity and her familial audience. Butler states that the melancholic is in a
state of “disavowed loss,” which is to say that “one has lost something, even though one
does not know precisely what one has lost” (Butler 120). Here, Butler asserts that the
melancholic is a person who can’t articulate her sense of what or who she has lost.
Additionally, Butler states, “the other point that Freud makes here is that the melancholic
tends to incorporate some of the traits of the one who is lost, especially the one who is
lost through disavowal” (Butler 120). Even before it is evident that the world is ending,
Claire’s family is in disarray—her parents are bitterly divorced, her husband is constantly
antagonistic, and her sister is detached, withdrawn, and dysfunctional. In the wake of her
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family’s disorder, Claire functions solely to re-establish and sustain a sense of order in
her family. However, although Claire internalizes the order her family has lost, the “one
who is lost through disavowal” for her is the stability of her performative identity’s
audience (Butler 120). Claire is oblivious to the fact that the identity she constructs as
the custodian of her family requires her family’s existence to necessitate it. Thus, her
identity as the steward of her family alleviates her anxiety about losing her family, but it
also works to maintain the existence of her family—her identity’s diegetic audience.
Claire is unable to acknowledge the possibility of losing her family. Her inability
to consider this potentiality reveals her anxiety over the consequences it would have. For
Claire, losing her family would reduce her world to chaos. As a result, Claire wastes
away the last few days of her family’s (and the Earth’s) existence attempting to mitigate
the effects of the apocalypse. She irrationally and pointlessly refuses to give up her
performative identity as her family’s caretaker by prioritizing practical measures over the
uncontrollability of their (potential) mutual destruction, an outcome that identity doesn’t
allow her to recognize. Additionally, she struggles to accept that she has no control over
the state of her family. In fact, the only fear she experiences is anxiety that she can no
longer protect and preserve her family as the world teeters on the brink of destruction.
Thus, Claire’s fear is just a new manifestation of her performative identity—rather than
shed this constructed identity and transform, Claire embodies that identity and preemptively mourns its loss.
The first section of the film—“Justine”—focuses on how Claire's anxiety over
losing her family extends even to potential family members. During this half of the film,
she attempts to facilitate Justine's elaborate wedding reception in order to ensure the
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success of her marriage. Before the reception, Claire asks Justine, “so you want this?”
The implication at this stage of the film is unclear, but later the film reveals that Justine
really doesn’t want the attention and the ritualistic responsibility required of a bride at her
wedding reception. Moreover, her lack of desire for this event ruins her marriage and the
extension of her (and Claire’s) family. In this way, Claire’s question and her framing of
that question in an affirmative light—she asks Justine if she wants this event and not if
she doesn’t want it—exposes Claire’s concern that her family might be further
destabilized by this event. Additionally, her failure to explicitly state this concern in her
question demonstrates her inability to recognize the loss of the potential family she would
gain through Justine’s marriage over and above her own, established family.
Throughout the party, Claire attempts to cover up Justine’s debilitating depression
so that she can participate in the different events and make the appearances required of a
bride at her reception. In this way, Claire functions as a buffer between Justine and the
guests who attend in order to recognize Justine’s marriage to Michael (Alexander
Skarsgård). Time and time again, Justine’s mental illness gets the best of her and
prevents her from completing the social tasks her guests and her husband expect her to
perform. In a review for the LA Times, Betsey Sharkey writes, “As the reception unfolds
in all the traditional ways — the toasts, first dance, cake cutting, throwing the bouquet —
Justine begins to disappear. To slip inside the melancholia that she hoped the ritual of the
wedding, the marriage would keep at bay” (Sharkey). Sharkey’s use of the word “ritual”
is particularly poignant in describing Claire’s perception of the entire event. Claire sees
the reception as a series of rituals that Justine must complete in order to establish a family
through her marriage successfully. Justine starts off on the wrong foot by showing up
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several hours late to the reception. When Claire first welcomes Justine and Michael to
the party, she approaches Justine visibly irritated and states “I won’t even bother saying
how late you are.”
The film obfuscates Justine’s and Michael’s tardiness, which in turn highlights
Claire’s irritation and desire for the event’s ritualistic and formal success. Marta
Figlerowicz in “Comedy of Abandon: Lars von Trier’s Melancholia” writes:
The gravity or inconsequence of Justine and Michael’s trespass
could only be measured by their guests’ wait, but that wait is
obscured. Rather than give you grounds for anger or frustration, von
Trier lets you take in these negative feelings without a timescale that
could justify or dispel them. He’s not making light of the feelings
themselves, not exactly, but of the standards of seriousness by which
we might want to test their weight. (Figerlowicz 23, emphasis mine)
According to Figerlowicz, the altered timescale the film presents in this moment
downplays this lateness and magnifies Claire’s reaction. The film’s temporal alteration
manipulates the significance of both the misstep and the response in the way Figerlowicz
asserts. It also announces that the film wants to explore Claire’s reactions to the
subsequent events presented in the film, not the events themselves. Shortly after her
irritated greeting of Justine and Michael, Claire insists that this reception is “very much
not [her] project.” She shifts the responsibility for the party’s success to the wedding
planner; yet, the timescale of this sequence has already visibly asserted her as the event’s
custodian since it is Claire—not the wedding planner—who first appears when Justine
arrives, and it is Claire—not the camera—who establishes the couples’ lateness. Claire’s
custodial role continues throughout the evening as Justine repeatedly fails to uphold her
ritualistic duties as a bride. When Justine first tells Claire that she is struggling with the
reception, Claire instructs her not to tell Michael. Essentially, Claire implicitly tells
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Justine to fake it or, in Butlerian terms, to adopt a “drag” identity—that is, an identity
which is “appropriated, theatricalized, worn, and done . . . a kind of imitation that
produces the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of the imitation
itself” (Butler 1713). Justine repeatedly fails to imitate happiness while Claire repeatedly
tries to cover up Justine’s failures. In this way, both women construct their identities
along Butlerian performative lines—that is, through repeated actions.16 However, it is
Claire who is not only the Butlerian melancholic, but also the Butlerian ‘performer’ since
she constructs an identity through repetition; whereas, Justine is a kind of Butlerian
mutation—she is an anti-performer, a person who repeatedly fails to construct an identity.
The cutting of the wedding cake is the most visibly clear and revealing ritual
failure in establishing the dichotomy between Justine and Claire. This scene takes place
immediately after Justine admits to Claire that she is “trudging through” the reception.
The camera starts the sequence with a close-up of Michael’s hand holding a cake knife
and server. The only sound is the indistinct murmuring of party guests who have
gathered around the cake. The camera cuts to Michael’s face. He holds his hands
together in front of his body in a posture of patience as he looks out into the crowd. The
camera then cuts to Claire who awkwardly smiles and uncomfortably fiddles with the
itinerary sheet she’s had since she first appeared in the film. There is still no sound but
the murmuring crowd and no sign of Justine. The camera pans over to the crowd behind
Claire—a group who aren’t speaking or smiling despite the sounds of audible indistinct
chatter. Finally, the camera cuts to Justine who is taking a bath with a look of complete
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neutrality on her face. The significance of this sequence is that the discomfort both
Michael and Claire exhibit is a result of their being watched by a crowd they are failing
to appease. The crowd is present to watch and by watching legitimize Justine and
Michael’s marriage when they share the first piece of the wedding cake. However, since
Justine isn’t present, the crowd is left to observe awkwardly as Michael and his sister-inlaw attempt to be patient. Michael and Claire cannot perform their ritualistic duties in
this moment because an integral member of the performance is absent. The juxtaposition
of Claire’s visible discomfort with Justine’s blankness in the tub captures the significance
of the ritual for Claire and its insignificance for Justine. Justine’s and Claire’s mother
(Charlotte Rampling) captures the relationship between the two women aptly when she
states to Justine, “your sister, it seems, is somewhat bewitched by you.”
A.O. Scott describes the differences between the two sisters as a matter of
spontaneity: “[c]ompared with the humorless, grimly responsible Claire, Justine is
impulsive, self-indulgent and charming: the flighty grasshopper to her sister’s
responsible, dutiful ant” (Scott). Justine’s impulsiveness leads to her choosing to end her
marriage to Michael before the wedding night is over. This is the last straw in a series of
missteps and failures throughout the night that leads Claire to tell Justine, “sometimes I
hate you so much.” As the “responsible, dutiful ant” Claire can’t fathom Justine’s
seemingly selfish, nonconforming behavior (Scott). Figlerowicz describes Claire’s
perspective of Justine’s actions as “self-indulgent”: “Justine bucks under her guests’
expectations . . . The greater the gifts Justine receives . . . the more self-indulgent
she seems in morosely rejecting them” (Figlerowicz 23). However, Justine’s behavior
can only be seen as “self-indulgent” through Claire’s perception of the reception as a

Semerad 88
“ritual.” For Claire, the entire party is not for Justine, it’s about Justine honoring her
family and friends, and expanding her family. If Justine doesn’t complete the rituals
required of her, then Justine’s and Claire’s potential and current family will be in jeopardy.
However, the reason Justine doesn’t make these decisions is not that she is self-absorbed
in this way; instead, she rejects the ritual of the event because she can’t bear to participate
in them—the attention and the spectacle are too much for her and she can’t physically or
emotionally go through with it.
Justine shuts down by the end of the evening, culminating in a sequence of her
standing at a balcony overlooking a crowd of happy guests waiting for her to throw her
bouquet. The sequence starts with a point-of-view shot of Justine’s perspective as she
looks down at the guests. The next shot shows a medium, hand-cam shot of Justine
looking morosely down at the crowd. This unsteady shot then tilts down and focuses on
the bouquet. The next shot is from the crowd’s perspective looking up at Justine and
Michael. Justine freezes with a dour expression on her face. After a strained pause,
Claire walks up to Justine, grabs the bouquet from her, and drops it into the crowd of
guests who give a cheer. This sequence illustrates Justine’s cumulative performative
collapse. She cannot perform the basic rituals of a bride. This sequence also confirms
Claire’s performative identity as a custodian of order. Claire understands that Justine’s
actions will cause the event to fall into disarray. So, she acts in Justine's stead in an
attempt to uphold order. Despite Claire’s actions, the event still ends in catastrophe. In
this way, the film foreshadows the ultimately downfall of her family, the end of her
performative identity.
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This first section of the film ends with Claire’s unconscious admission about the
triviality of her performative identity as the custodian of her family in the face of the loss
of her family. The wedding planner (Udo Kier) had set up a jar full of white beans in the
lobby of the house. As guests arrived, they were to submit a guess as to the number of
beans in the jar in the hopes of winning some prize. After storming away from Justine,
Claire enters the house presumably to go to bed. On her way, the wedding planner and
the butler (Jesper Christensen) stop her to tell her that the final count of the beans has
been confirmed—“six-hundred and seventy-eight.” The wedding planner tells Claire that
“None of the guests got it right . . . some were pretty close, but no one guessed right.”
Claire responds with the following statement: “incredible . . . incredibly trivial.”
While this contest is a small part of the event, it is only “trivial” to Claire because the
purpose of the night—the extension of her family—has not been accomplished. If the
reception hadn’t gone so poorly, this contest would have been just as significant as any of
the other rituals of the evening. Therefore, though she doesn’t realize it at this moment,
Claire is aware that the trappings of order—like her performative identity—become less
important in the wake of greater losses. In this way, her response to the ensuing end of
the world is all the more ironic as she disregards the implications of the coming
apocalypse in order to keep up her role as the guardian of her family.
The second section of Melancholia—“Claire”—focuses on Claire’s anxiety about
the potential collision of Melancholia and the Earth. This section opens with two
conflicts between Claire and her husband John (Kiefer Sutherland), which reveal this
anxiety. Justine is coming to stay with Claire and John because, as Claire puts it, “she’s
ill.” Justine’s depression has worsened to the point where she can no longer take care of
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herself. John thinks Justine is a “bad influence on [Claire] and Leo,” the couples’ young
son (Cameron Spurr). John starts to walk away from the argument when he asks Claire if
she has “been going online again.” This question seems unrelated to the previous conflict
until Claire looks down and states that she’s “afraid of that stupid planet.” From the
context, “going online” means looking at information about the chance that Melancholia
will collide with Earth. Furthermore, this moment shows that Claire wants Justine to
come stay with them not only because she’s suffering from depression, but also because
Claire is worried that the end is near. This sparks the second conflict within this scene as
John tries calmly to assuage Claire’s concern by insisting that Melancholia will not
collide with Earth. John claims that Melancholia will simply “fly by” the Earth, which
will be a beautiful scene to observe. In fact, he explains, “this is going to be the most
amazing experience we will have in our lives.”
The rest of this section of Melancholia focuses on the growth of this second
conflict between John and Claire as Melancholia moves closer to the Earth. On the outset
John takes the position that Melancholia is harmless while Claire takes the more skeptical
position. However, it is important to note that in this section of the film both take
precautionary measures in case disaster does strike. John buys boxes of supplies “in case
Melancholia gets really close,” or so he justifies his hypocrisy to Justine who witnesses
him bringing in the supplies. He asks Justine not to tell Claire about his actions because
“she gets anxious so easily,” not because it would reveal that he isn’t completely certain
in his belief that they will be safe. Claire, as noted earlier, buys suicide pills after John
brings in his supplies. John catches her securing them in a locked drawer and asks, “do
you plan to kill us all? Maybe I should take them.” Claire shoots back vehemently
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stating, “don’t you [John] touch them.” The pills are Claire’s last resort to maintain
control of her family’s continuity—without the pills, Claire would have no control over
her audience's death. Instead, they would simply be taken by a world that grows rapidly
more threatening and ominous each day.
Throughout the second section of Melancholia, Claire repeats several actions that
reaffirm her custodial performative identity, and establish her family as the audience of
that identity: namely, she takes care of Justine and Leo in a variety of ways. The
repetition of this action is significant in establishing Claire’s performative identity
because, as I note throughout this thesis, repeated actions are the only ‘defining’ actions
in Butlerian performativity. Butler states, “[t]he first point to understand about
performativity is what it is not: identities are not made in a single moment in time . . .
[t]hey are made again and again” (Butler 116). Here Butler explicates the repetitive
nature of the actions that comprise performative identities. Applying this Butlerian
perspective, the actions that Claire repeats make up her identity (same goes for Randy,
Nina, the man, James, and Tommy). So the custodial actions she repeats time and time
again with Justine and Leo—cooking for them, helping them bathe, putting them to
bed—performatively construct her identity in the sense that they occur in numerous
instances over time. The first section of the film establishes Claire’s custodial identity as
focused on expanding her family through Justine’s marriage; the second section of the
film reiterates Claire’s identity in a context where she attempts to preserve and control the
continuity of the family she already has. Importantly, Claire’s decision to buy the suicide
pills can be seen as an extension of that identity: if her family is going to end, she wants
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to hold onto a semblance of control, even if the only control she can have is providing a
peaceful end.
During the last two days before Melancholia collides with the Earth, Claire’s
anxiety and panic become overwhelming as she begins to realize that her family and her
performative identity are seriously threatened. Her family (and audience), which she
works so hard to maintain, begins to slip from her when she tells Justine she’s ready to
help her bathe. Justine informs her that she has already done so without assistance.
Immediately after this development, Claire launches into a speech about how the butler
didn’t come to the house that day: “You [Justine] see, it’s never happened before that he
didn’t come into work without giving us notice.” Justine asks if he has a family and
suggests that “maybe this is a time he needs to be with them.” Put another way, the end
of the world isn’t a time for Claire to worry about something so trivial. Claire and
Justine’s conversation in this moment exposes how Claire’s calm exterior vanishes at the
same time Justine regains the capacity to take care of herself. This exchange reveals a
key distinction between Claire, who is constantly recreating her custodial identity, and
Justine, who fails to construct any performative identity whatsoever: namely, the
apocalypse delegitimizes Claire’s performative identity just as it provides Justine with a
source of relief. Peter Bradshaw in his review of Melancholia for The Guardian writes:
“[i]t is Claire, supposedly the calm one, who succumbs to hyperventilating panic; for
depressive Justine, the apocalypse is an ecstatic relief” (Bradshaw). Justine embraces the
apocalypse because it signifies a cessation from the rituals of life. Unfortunately for
Claire, this cessation renders her performative identity superfluous.
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Melancholia presents Justine’s acceptance of the end of the world as—in A.O.
Scott’s words—“more graceful” than Claire’s pragmatism (Scott). After it becomes clear
that Melancholia will collide with the Earth, Claire’s practical measures are undone: she
is unable to give the suicide pills to her family because John takes them all for himself.
In this way, Claire’s performative identity does nothing but allow her husband to avoid
having to face his prediction’s failure. Thus, John’s consumption of the pills
demonstrates the uselessness of Claire’s performative identity. Significantly, in the end,
it is Justine who seems collected and in control. She calmly takes care of Claire, who
weeps uncontrollably, and Leo, who is blissfully ignorant, through the last few moments
of their lives. She has Leo construct a crude tent made of sticks—what she calls “the
magic cave”—which she tells him will protect them from the effects of Melancholia’s
collision with the Earth. The ramshackle structure Leo constructs is a symbol of the
Butlerian performative identity: it is a haphazard aggregate of repeated components—in
the case of Leo’s tent, sticks—that can only superficially liberate its occupant from her
corporeal existence. Moreover, it is only functional in the sense that its creator and some
legitimizing observer believe it to be so. As Melancholia barrels into the Earth
destroying the structure along with Claire, Justine, and Leo, the film shows that “social
constructs” like performative identities cannot exist without the observing “public”—that
is, without an audience (Butler 526).
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The Fountain: Tommy Creo
The Fountain presents itself as a powerful love story pondering the problem of
mortality and eternal love. Tommy and Izzie are in love with each other, but Izzie’s
aggressive brain tumor dominates their relationship. Tommy, a cancer researcher, spends
all of his time and energy searching for a cure to save Izzie because he can’t bear the
thought of living without her. In this way, Tommy constructs his identity as the preserver
and savior of their love. Because he can’t accept the possibility of life without Izzie,
Tommy depends on that role not only to try to save Izzie, but also to preserve himself. In
this way, Tommy’s dependence on his performative identity forces him to spend his time
in the lab trying to save Izzie instead of spending his time with her. In the end, Tommy’s
performative identity fails to save Izzie. The film uses two secondary plotlines to
demonstrate both how Izzie knows Tommy will fail, and how Tommy’s failure destroys
his performative identity. According to the film, the prospect of the death of his wife—
the audience of his performative identity—is an existential threat to Tommy since he can
no longer construct his identity performatively if she is gone. Thus, Tommy’s noble
mission to save his wife is also a selfish quest to preserve his own identity.
Early in the film, Izzie describes how a Mayan guide she traveled with once told
her that his father had a tree planted over his grave so he could grow into the tree and
become a part of the living world again—how death was his “road to awe”, his way to
overcome his transient corporeal existence. Izzie subscribes to this doctrine, which
glorifies the necessary terminus of life in death. Significantly, Izzie’s subscription to this
idea angers Tommy who constructs an identity in a Butlerian fashion—that is, he
constructs his identity performatively. However, this performative construction depends
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upon Izzie’s legitimization, which, in turn, requires her to be alive. Butler’s theory of the
performative construction of identity asserts itself as a means to overcome the oppressive
biological essentialism entailed in previous theories of human identity. For Butler, the
social construction of identity through performativity liberates the person from the
“normalizing categories of oppressive structures” used by “regulatory regimes” (Butler
1707). Here Butler intends to disrupt the concretizing nature of any essentialist identity
theory and describe identity as non-essential, a point I will describe in more depth
shortly.17 Tommy’s response to Izzie’s acceptance of her death, however, shows how his
construction of identity is undone in her death. In this way, The Fountain demonstrates
that the Butlerian performative construction of identity is intrinsically dependent upon the
existence of a specific audience to confirm that identity.
As noted in the preceding analyses of Nina's, Randy's, He's, James's, and Claire’s
performative identities, the defining factors for Tommy’s performative identity—in
Butler’s understanding of performativity—are the actions he repeats. That is, for Butler,
performative identities are social constructs that are repeatedly established and
instantiated through actions that are “effected with the strategic aim of maintaining” the
identity itself (Butler 526). In the film, the only actions Tommy repeats are actions
intended to cure Izzie’s cancer. The film captures the repetition of one specific action—
Tommy choosing to stay at the lab instead of going for a walk with Izzie—by showing
the same exact sequence three separate times in the film. The sequence shows Tommy
working at his desk in the lab. Izzie comes in and asks Tommy to “take a walk with
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[her].” Tommy says he can’t because he’s got a lot of work to do. When Izzie insists by
telling him “it’s the first snow,” Tommy replies angrily and exasperatedly stating, “please
Izzie.” After this seething response, Izzie walks away, not unhappy but disappointed.
Tommy realizes his rudeness and tries to chase after her, but his lab assistant stops him to
inform him that he needs to be in surgery. The sequence ends here. Because this scene is
repeated three times in The Fountain, it cinematically demonstrates how Tommy
constructs his performative identity as a crusader for Izzie’s health. Moreover, it
highlights how Tommy’s performative identity is deeply tied to Izzie’s survival.
The film contains three different plotlines. The summary above describes the
main plotline in the film; however, there are two thematically related, but otherwise
distinct stories in the film. One story concerns a conquistador, Tomás, searching for the
tree of life. The other focuses on a lonely space traveler, Tom, who takes care of a dying
tree. These two additional stories are born out of a writing project Izzie initiates and
Tommy finishes. The conquistador story is Izzie’s contribution to the project, and the
space traveler story is Tommy’s. Izzie, when she realizes she is going to die, instructs
Tommy to “finish it [her story].” Tommy claims he doesn’t know how it ends, and
implies that he cannot complete it. The film never shows him working on it. However,
the film reveals that his section—the one involving the space traveler—does in fact
conclude the project as Tomás discovering the tree of life concludes Izzie's section
without any mention or description of Tom and his mission.
The Fountain intercuts these three stories in a rhythmic pattern that decentralizes
the present, and destabilizes the chronological order of the past and the future. Izzie’s
conquistador storyline takes place in the sixteenth century and so represents the past. The
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main storyline concerning Izzie’s illness and Tommy’s attempt to cure her takes place in
the early twenty-first century and so represents the present. Tommy’s space traveler
storyline takes place in the twenty-sixth century and so represents the future. Importantly,
Hugh Jackman, (who plays Tommy, Tomás, and Tom) is the only actor who appears in all
three sections. In this way, the film characterizes Tommy in a disrupted fashion that
mirrors the Butlerian nature of his identity construction18. A.O. Scott in his review for
the New York Times describes the film’s structure as “a circular, swirling pattern that
suggests a mandala or a Mayan calendar . . . Like a story by Jorge Luis Borges, The
Fountain dispenses with everyday assumptions about time, space and causality and tries
to replace the prose of narrative cinema with a poetic language of rhyming images and
visual metaphors” (Scott). Scott’s analysis is accurate for the overall presentation of the
film as the narrative alternates between storylines in a cyclical way that disrupts the
normal passage of time by blending the storylines into one another. Yet, Scott’s analysis
is incorrect in regards to the temporality of the events in the storylines when examined in
isolation. The primary plotline begins with Izzie alive and living at home, and ends with
Izzie dead after succumbing to her cancer in the hospital. Thus, it is strictly
chronological. Izzie’s secondary conquistador plot begins at its penultimate scene, then
reverts to its first scene and continues in a chronological arc. As a result, it only contains
one scene presented non-chronologically. The film presents Tommy’s secondary space
traveler plot in a strictly chronological way despite its being the most fantastical storyline.
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This arc begins with the space traveler’s orb19 moving towards the nebula Xibalba, and
ends with him reaching the nebula. Therefore, the film as a whole is nonlinear and
circular, but the individual plotlines themselves are, for the most part, linear and
chronological.
The visual repetition of Jackman playing all three men contributes to the
construction of Tommy’s performative identity in the Butlerian sense. Butler’s theory
contends that the construction of identity takes place in repeated, stylized, visually
observable acts. In The Fountain, the repetition of the same actor (albeit in different
outfits and hairstyles) as three different characters facilitates the conflation of those three
characters' identities, and, furthermore, allows the performative identity of the main
character, Tommy, to contain attributes of the other two. In his essay “Performativity in
Buñuel's ‘The Phantom of Liberty’ and ‘The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie,’” Ibon
Izurieta applies Butler’s understanding of performativity to early surrealist film. Izurieta
states that Butlerian performativity renders “identity and individuality as non-essential
entities” (Izurieta 754). According to Izurieta, Butlerian performativity removes the
naturalness of identity. He asserts that, for Butler, identity is an effect created through a
person’s actions and the context in which those actions occur, and is not an a priori
feature of the person. Izurieta describes how a character's identity in film is constructed
in a similarly non-essential fashion:
Devoid of speech, the mise-en-scene and the semiotics of camera
shots and angles materialize immediately the identity of the
characters portrayed. The characters are materialized and are even
interpellated visually and semiotically into specific individuals.
19
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Their sign of identity, through the costuming and visual appearance
of normative categories that are iterated in the scene, establishes
who they are. The materialization of their identities is further
consolidated by the director's vision and by the enactment of the
actor/actress. (Izurieta 756)
Izurieta essentially argues that the identity of filmic characters, as a “non-essential” entity,
is a post facto product of the mechanical and stylistic features of the film itself. In this
way, Tommy, Tom, and Tomás’s individual identities are cinematically compromised
because they are enacted by the same actor. They are neither “interpellated visually” nor
“semiotically” into “specific individuals” because they are visually identical and play the
same role—the lover—in each storyline (Izurieta 756). As a result, the film literalizes the
Butlerian construction of identity in creating these three men in a disrupted, yet visually
similar way. In doing so, the film stylistically embodies the constructed nature of Tomás
and Tom as products of Izzie and Tommy, respectively, as well as Tommy’s construction
of his performative identity as Izzie’s lover and guardian.
The Fountain’s visual conflation of Tommy with Tomás and Tom allows each
secondary plotline to alter the significance of the main plotline. Additionally, the fact that
these secondary plotlines are literally created within the main plotline by Izzie and
Tommy encourages a deconstructive reading of the secondary plotlines. Izzie’s
conquistador plotline describes how she perceives Tommy’s mission to save her as
courageous, but fundamentally misguided. Tommy’s space-traveler plotline reveals how
Tommy’s performative identity dies with Izzie.
Izzie’s secondary plotline about the conquistador, Tomás, emphasizes her
acceptance that Tommy’s improbable mission to save her will fail. Throughout Izzie’s
work, she characterizes Tomás (and so Tommy) as a passionate, determined, yet
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profoundly and harmfully mistaken man. In the story, Tomás is charged by Queen
Isabella (Rachel Weisz20) with the task of finding the ‘tree of life’ in New Spain (South
America) in order to “deliver Spain from bondage.” The Queen tells Tomás that if he
succeeds she will marry him. He accepts her charge and leaves her and Spain behind.
Like Tommy, Tomás fights for his loves—his Queen and country—in absentia.
Additionally, both Tommy and Tomás fail. Izzie dies before Tommy can save her, and
although he finds the tree of life, Tomás is unable to retrieve it for the Queen. Moreover,
both men’s impetus to act is to preserve the fragile continuity of their weakened or
mortally threatened loves—the women who legitimize their missions and hence their
performative identities. Importantly, Tomás is a world away from the woman he loves
attempting to complete a mission that only seems tenuously related to its intended effect.
In this way, the gulf between Tomás and the Queen figuratively represents Izzie’s
perception of the distance between Tommy and her. Additionally, the uselessness of
Tomás’s mission signifies her opinion of Tommy’s work as a kind of symbolic gesture
with no chance of tangible success. The fact is Izzie is ready to die. She wants to spend
her last days with Tommy, the man she loves, but he cannot see this nor can he accept this.
Filip Vukcevic writes in a review of the film for IGN that Tommy “is wholly committed
to his goal: he will not let Izzie die. Tragically, he forsakes the few, final moments that
they have together for more time in his lab . . . He is a man driven by a passion so
consuming that it hollows him out, filling the whole of him” (Vukcevic). Vukcevic’s
description of Tommy’s passion as “consuming” highlights the anxiety behind it: Tommy
20
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is so focused on saving Izzie's life because losing her means losing the identity he has
constructs through her. He doesn’t recognize that she is something other than the
audience for her performative identity: he doesn’t see that she is lonely and desperate to
have him with her as her husband. She playfully calls Tommy “my conquistador”, but
there is a strained admission behind this moniker. Tommy is always elsewhere fighting
battles for Izzie; he isn’t with her.
Tommy’s space traveler plotline allegorically presents the futility of his attempts
to save Izzie, and emphasizes how Izzie’s death causes the disintegration of his
performative identity. Tom is a space traveler caring for a dying tree as they both journey
towards a nebula that will soon explode. Considering that Tommy plants a tree above
Izzie’s grave as well as the relationship in Tomás’s quest between a tree and saving his
love, it is clear the tree in this story signifies Tommy’s love—in other words, Izzie. Tom
attempts to keep the tree alive, but he fails. In this way, Tom metaphorically represents
Tommy’s performative identity. Unlike Tommy in the main plotline, Tom dies with the
tree. He travels to Xibalba with the dead tree where the nebula finally explodes,
consuming the tree’s remains and him. In this way, Tommy’s secondary plotline links
Izzie’s death to the end of his identity as her “conquistador.” However, even in this
mediated form, Tommy doesn’t want to accept this consequence. In his secondary
plotline, the image of Izzie interrupts the narrative as Tom’s hallucination. Tom angrily
shouts at her image “leave me alone.” Hence, neither Tommy nor Tom wants to face the
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reality that Izzie is dying. For Tommy, Tom’s death represents the end of his
performative identity as well as the end of his relationship with Izzie21.
Returning to the circular nature of The Fountain’s narrative structure, the film
repeatedly uses the circle as a motif of both human mortality and the tangible
representation of the relationship between Tommy's performative identity and his familial
diegetic audience. The film’s opening montage establishes the thematic significance of
circles. The opening shot depicts a hand writing the lines of Genesis wherein God casts
Adam and Eve from Eden and places a cherub with a flaming sword to guard the tree of
life on beige paper. This shot quickly dissolves into two consecutive images. The first
image contains the lines of scriptures, but with concentric circles around it. The
concentric circles, which surround the words, look like the rings of a tree. It is as if the
camera presents a cross-section of the tree, and these lines of scripture are at its heart.
This reading provides important insight into the impossibility of Tommy’s attempts to
prevent Izzie’s death because these lines of scripture finalize humanity’s mortality—
humans will never be immortal because God cast them out of Eden. The second image
also has the lines of scripture superimposed on it. This image depicts a globular blue
jewel surrounded by golden circles. Initially, the image is ambiguous, but the camera
21

The fact that losing Izzie is equally traumatic for Tommy is significant because it distinguishes his
performative identity from the man in Antichrist’s. Both Tommy and the man use their medical expertise to
assist their sick wives, and so the two men appear similar. However, the man chooses to treat his wife
because of his occupational hubris—his wife could just have easily stayed in the hospital and continued to
take her medication. In Tommy’s case, he is the leader of a team of cancer researchers, and he doesn’t
attempt to directly treat his wife. He tries to find a cure for her, but he still insists that she sees her own
doctor, and he attempts to heed her doctor’s orders. In these ways, while they have similar kinds of
projects (healing their wives), the man from Antichrist and Tommy approach their work from very different
places. Tommy fears that he will lose his wife and his performative identity; the man uses his wife’s illness
to reconstruct his performative identity. For Tommy, Izzie is his performative identity’s audience; for the
man, his wife is part of the performance.
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zooms out to reveal it is the center of golden mandala with a crucifix on top of it. The
shrine unites the planetary image of the jewel with the iconography of the cross. The
next several shots reveal Tomás and several other conquistadors praying before the
mandala-crucifix. Later on, Tomás takes out a small leather pouch and smells it causing
the film’s score to grow louder as Tomás’s face dissolves away to reveal the Queen
smiling with wide shining eyes, and circular earrings. This shot cuts to Tomás who
accepts a ring from the Queen. The camera then cuts to a crane shot above the heads of
the Queen and Tomás as Tomás walks away revealing a circular pattern on the floor
which dissolves back to the mandala-crucifix. The camera then shows Tomás take the
ring out of the leather pouch. After looking quickly back at the shrine, he hesitates then
puts the ring back in the pouch. These last few images of the film’s opening sequence
highlight the symbolic value of circles as intermediaries for the sources of social
constructs like myths, religion, and performative identities. The opening concentric
circles literally internalize scripture to show how mortality gives rise to the two
mythological trees in the film, which transcend the human condition (the tree of life, and
the tree which symbolizes Izzie). The mandala-crucifix connects religion and the
mystery of the cosmos. Ultimately and most importantly, the ring connects two separated
lovers, Tomás and the Queen, and legitimizes the former’s quest.
In The Fountain, each man in the three storylines engages with a ring in a
different way; however, the ring always represents the man’s connection to his raison
d’être. In the film’s main storyline, Tommy loses his wedding ring during an
experimental surgery in which he fails to find a cure for Izzie. This moment figuratively
foreshadows how Tommy will lose Izzie’s support and confirmation of his performative
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identity because she is going to die. In Izzie’s conquistador storyline, Tomás has a ring
that he never wears. The Queen instructs Tomás to put on the ring when he reaches Eden;
however, he fails to put on the ring because the tree of life consumes him during a strange,
supernatural death sequence. In this way, Tomás’s relationship with the Queen is never
fully established. Applying Izzie’s view of her relationship with Tommy to this storyline,
it is clear that Izzie believes Tommy’s mission to save her consumes him, and precludes
him from maintaining the continuity of their love without her. In Tommy’s space traveler
storyline, Tom has a ring tattooed on his finger in addition to numerous rings and circles
tattooed along his arm which signify the passage of time. The permanence and embodied
nature of Tom’s tattooed ring suggest his relationship is similarly permanent. In this way,
Tom and the tree—Tommy’s performative identity and Izzie—are viscerally connected:
without the tree, Tom cannot exist; without Izzie, Tommy can’t successfully construct his
performative identity.
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Coda: A Positive Perspective on the Future of Butlerian Performativity
This thesis has explored the nature of the relationship between the performative
construction of identity and audience. The most important conclusion this investigation
has led to is the profound dependence that performative identities have on audiences—
that is, observing agents who confirm or reject the authenticity or reality of those
performative constructs. In showing this, this thesis has levied a measured critique of
Judith Butler’s articulation of performativity. According to the robust critical theory
developed through the six twenty-first century films I have examined, Butler has not fully
integrated and evaluated the role of ‘the audience’ in the performative construction of
identity.
At this point, it is helpful to return to Butler’s comparison of seeing a transvestite
on stage with seeing a transvestite on a bus, which was first analyzed in the introduction.
Butler uses this example in her work to distinguish her understanding of performativity
from theatrical performativity. In her conception, the transvestite on the stage does not
construct an identity performatively, whereas the transvestite on a bus does. Butler writes:
Indeed, the sight of a transvestite onstage can compel pleasure and
applause while the sight of the same transvestite on the seat next to
us on the bus can compel fear, rage, even violence. (Butler 527)
For Butler, the transvestite in the first context can be de-realized because of the
assumption of the falsity of a person’s actions on the stage. However, the transvestite on
the bus cannot—or, at least, is not—de-realized in this way because a person’s actions in
the mundane social environment entails the assumption of truth. In this way, Butler
implicitly acknowledges the transformative power of the audience, or the observing agent.
In her example, it isn’t the transvestite whose performance changes; it is the observing
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party whose context changes. Thus, in this example, Butler expresses—albeit
indirectly—that the burden of confirming and a legitimizing performative acts lies with
the observer, or, applying my label, the audience.
The entailment of the audience within Butler’s conception of performativity
requires a more careful application and deployment of the concept. With this new
conceptual baggage, performativity does not universally liberate identity. It only
restructures the formulation of identity onto softer ground. Rather than enmeshing
identity with a person’s biological and genetic makeup, identity becomes, as Butler
intended, a social construct. However, this development does not make identity so
malleable as to warrant any alteration whatsoever. Moreover, the audience doesn’t force
individual performers to construct a perfect replica of its expectations either. In this way,
the audience doesn’t shape every detail of the performative identity, but has a great
influence over the general nature of that identity. Importantly, this is exactly how Butler
contends that identity is constructed. In her interview with Vasu Reddy, she states:
I accept neither the social determinism view nor the classical liberal
one. We cannot become anything we want. . . . there is one
reading of Gender Trouble, which suggests that a person can become
one thing one day and then something radically different the next. I
don't think that's true. There is another reading of Gender Trouble
that concludes that we are fully constituted, we are fully constructed
and that means that there is no freedom. I do not think that is true
either . . . (Butler 119)
Butler goes on to state that these readings of her theory are “understandable
misunderstandings, since they subscribe to the two oppositional moments within the
framework that [she is] trying to displace” (Butler 119). In this way, what is true for
Butler is that the system that constructs human autonomy as a function of human identity
is false in the sense that a person's autonomy isn't a feature of her identity; her identity is
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a product of her behavior no matter what degree of autonomy she has (if any). Thus,
Butler explicitly describes how her theory is not devised to completely liberate identity
nor is it devised to portray identity as absolute, necessary conformity. My addition of the
affirming audience into the construction of the performative identity succinctly captures
the subtle balance within Butler’s own theory. My intervention in Butler's theory has
shown that while performative identity is free from biological essentialism, it is not
devoid of outside influence altogether.
It is important to note (again) that my analysis has not dismantled the power of
Butler’s theory on gender per se. As I noted in my introduction, I don’t contest her
theory in this way nor have I intended to. In fact, I deliberately chose not to read into the
gender politics of any of the films, even in the cases where a given film such as Black
Swan or Antichrist begs to be read in such a way. The goal and intention of this project is
to show that many twenty-first century films have amassed a comprehensive
reformulation of the performative construction of identity that addresses an area that
Butler’s theory didn’t sufficiently address and needed to be addressed.
The implications of this thesis for future work on performative identity
construction as well as on twenty-first century film are two-fold. First, Butlerian
performativity functionally requires an observing agent to confirm identity as a social
construct. Second, Butler’s work on liberating gender is not undermined by this
requirement—in fact, I believe it is strengthened because it encourages society as a whole
to act collectively in liberating the gender terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ from the static,
stubborn binary ascribed by biology. In this way, the audience can have an overtly
positive influence by encouraging and confirming social goods rather than social ills.
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Additionally, this thesis strongly cautions the zealous, dogmatic followers of the
performative construction of identity described in Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism
and the Subversion of Identity.
In future analyses of both performativity and film, the dialectic structure of
performativity must be properly acknowledged and incorporated. That is, the influence
of the diegetic audience on the performative construction of identity can no longer be left
out of the conversation. Moreover, film should be seen as the ideal medium through
which to examine performativity given the innately visual nature of both (film and
performativity). Therefore, as the human understanding of performativity is reshaped and
revised, film analysis ought to be an integral part of the process.
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